Jakupovic v. State

The presumptively prejudicial near 19-month delay between the grant of the defendant's motion for a new trial on charges of murder and related offenses did not cause the defendant actual prejudice.

Thank you for sharing!

Your article was successfully shared with the contacts you provided.

Ekrem Jakupovic appeals from the denial of his motion to dismiss his indictment on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. We affirm. The record shows that, following an April 2006 jury trial, Jakupovic was found guilty of felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. On May 18, 2006, Jakupovic filed a motion for a new trial, which, on February 7, 2008, the trial court granted based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In May 2009, Jakupovic was granted bond and released from prison, but he remains on house arrest. Since then, two witnesses for the State moved back to Mexico, and the case was set for an August 31, 2009 retrial. Although Jakupovic never filed a statutory motion for speedy trial, on October 24, 2008, Jakupovic filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied on October 30, 2009.

1. Jakupovic’s constitutional speedy trial claim must be analyzed under the rubric of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972. Under Barker ‘s four-part balancing test, the Court must consider: 1 the length of the delay; 2 reasons for the delay; 3 defendant’s assertion of the right to speedy trial; and 4 the prejudice to the defendant. Standing alone, none of these factors are a necessary, or sufficient condition to a finding of deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, but rather should be considered as part of a balancing test. Thus, we must apply and weigh these factors together to determine if Jakupovic’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been abridged. Citations omitted. Layman v. State , 284 Ga. 83, 84 663 SE2d 169 2008. On appeal, a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to dismiss based on an alleged violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Burns v. State , 265 Ga. 763 462 SE2d 622 1995.

Jakupovic v. State

The presumptively prejudicial near 19-month delay between the grant of the defendant's motion for a new trial on charges of murder and related offenses did not cause the defendant actual prejudice.

Share with Email

Thank you for sharing!

Trending Stories

More From ALM

Subscribe to Daily Report