Antonio Simmons, who stands accused in the Superior Court of Fulton County of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and other offenses, appeals from the denial of his motion for discharge and acquittal due to the State’s 22-month delay in bringing the case to trial. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, after balancing the relevant factors, that the State did not violate Simmons’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, we affirm. The record shows that in October 2007, Simmons was arrested in connection with an investigation of an armed robbery that occurred shortly before his arrest. Based on witnesses’ statements and identification, Simmons was indicted in October 2007 for armed robbery,1 aggravated assault2 three counts, false imprisonment3 three counts, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.4 Simmons, through counsel, filed in April 2008 a motion to suppress the witness identification, which motion was denied in June 2008. In November 2008, Simmons himself filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment based on a speedy trial violation, though it is not clear from the record whether he was represented by counsel at the time.5 In June 2009, Simmons, through counsel, filed a motion for discharge and acquittal based on a speedy trial violation. In August 2009, the trial court denied that motion, giving rise to this appeal. The template for deciding all constitutional speedy trial claims under the Sixth Amendment and the Georgia Constitution is laid out in the 1972 case of Barker v. Wingo 6 and the 1992 decision in Doggett v. United States 7 . . . . The analysis has two stages. First, the court must determine whether the interval from the accused’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation to the trial is sufficiently long to be considered “presumptively prejudicial.” If not, the speedy trial claim fails at the threshold. If, however, the delay has passed the point of presumptive prejudice, the court must proceed to the second step of the Barker-Doggett analysis, which requires the application of a delicate, context-sensitive, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the accused has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.8 We now turn to that analysis.
1. “The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches either at the time of the defendant’s arrest or at the time of his indictment, whichever occurs earlier.”9 Here, there was a 22-month delay between Simmons’s arrest and the denial of his speedy trial motion, and the State correctly concedes that such a delay is presumptively prejudicial.10 Accordingly, the Barker-Doggett factors must be considered.11
