In 1999, Vivian Hall conveyed her home to her son, Henry Hall, by executing a quitclaim deed. Nine years later, Henry Hall filed this action, seeking a writ of possession. Vivian Hall filed a counterclaim, averring that the parties had agreed to reserve a life estate to her. Vivian Hall sought to eject Henry Hall, who was then in sole control of the property, and to have the quitclaim deed rescinded or reformed because it failed to reserve a life estate to her.1 The Superior Court of Chatham County granted Henry Hall’s motion for summary judgment as to Vivian Hall’s counterclaim and, because Vivian Hall was no longer residing at the premises, declared the dispossessory warrant moot. For the reasons explained below, we reverse. Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. On appeal from the grant or denial of summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review, construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences most favorably to the nonmoving party. Citation and punctuation omitted. Gold Creek v. City of Dawsonville , 290 Ga. App. 807, 813 2 660 SE2d 858 2008; see also OCGA § 9-11-56 c. Viewed in the light most favorable to Vivian Hall, the record shows the following. In late 1999, Vivian Hall decided to convey the home where she had lived for approximately fifty years to her son, Henry Hall. In her affidavit submitted in opposition to Henry Hall’s motion for summary judgment, Vivian Hall deposed that it was the understanding of the parties that Vivian Hall’s conveyance of the subject property to Henry Hall was to include a reservation to Vivian Hall of a life estate in the subject property, including the full use and enjoyment of the subject property for the rest of her life. It was the understanding of the parties that in exchange for the conveyance of the subject property Henry Hall was to assist in caring for his mother since he lived with her. The quitclaim deed does not contain language which reserved a life estate unto Vivian Hall, which was a mutual mistake of the parties to the transaction. Vivian Hall’s daughters, Gail Screen and Janet Long, also understood that Vivian Hall intended to retain the right to live in the house until she died. Screen prepared the quitclaim deed using a standard form, which conveyed to the grantee “all the right, title, interest and claim which Vivian Hall has in and to” the subject property. Vivian Hall executed the deed on December 1, 1999.
For several years after the conveyance, Vivian Hall continued to live in the home and to pay household expenses. Later, the relationship between Henry Hall and his mother soured, and, in her view, he “started kicking her out of the house.” Finally, when his mother was absent from the house, Henry Hall had the locks changed. In September 2008, Henry Hall filed a dispossessory warrant, seeking a writ of possession. In her counterclaim, Vivian Hall averred that the parties had agreed to reserve a life estate to her and that Henry Hall had promised to care for her to the end of her life. Vivian Hall sought to eject Henry Hall and to have the quitclaim deed rescinded or reformed because it failed to reserve a life estate and because her son failed to care for her. The trial court found that there was no evidence that the parties intended for Vivian Hall to retain a life estate interest in the property.
