Appellee Regina Gordon Todd seeks to establish her right to a child’s share of the estate of testator John E. Buffington. The probate court denied a motion for summary judgment filed by the estate’s executors, appellants Beth Buffington Hood and Ginger Buffington Folger, by which they sought an adjudication as a matter of law that Todd was not a beneficiary under the testator’s will. This Court granted appellants’ application for interlocutory appeal, and, concluding that the probate court erred in finding a genuine issue of material fact regarding Todd’s beneficiary status, we now reverse. On appeal from the denial . . . of summary judgment the appellate court is to conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. Cits. Benton v. Benton , 280 Ga. 468, 470 629 SE2d 204 2006. So viewed, the undisputed evidence reflects that Buffington died in August 2006, leaving a will providing, in relevant part, for distribution of his personal and household effects to “his children surviving Buffington” and distribution of the residue of his estate to the Buffington Family Trust, under which “each then living child of Buffington” and “each deceased child of Buffington who shall leave issue then living” is to receive an equal share of the estate’s entire residue, in trust. The term “children” is specifically defined in the will, in pertinent part, as “only the lawful blood descendants in the first degree of the parent designated.” An introductory portion of the will reads, “I have two living children, Beth Buffington Hood and Ginger Buffington Folger.” In addition to being named co-executors of the will, Hood and Folger are also each appointed as trustee of the respective residuary trust established for her benefit. No other trustees of any other potential trusts other than a successor trustee are named. Todd claims to be Buffington’s biological daughter, asserting that she was fathered during an extra-marital affair between Buffington and Todd’s mother and that Buffington acknowledged her as his daughter during his life. As such, Todd claims that she is entitled to a child’s share of Buffington’s estate. Following the initiation of probate proceedings, Todd filed a separate action in superior court seeking a declaration of her beneficiary status under Buffington’s will and related equitable relief. The superior court transferred that action to the probate court, and appellants then moved for summary judgment on the issue of Todd’s beneficiary status, asserting that Buffington’s will unambiguously evinced his intent to exclude Todd as a beneficiary. Finding the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to Todd’s status under the will, the probate court denied the motion.
Though there may be a genuine issue of fact as to Todd’s status as Buffington’s daughter, we conclude that resolution of this issue is unnecessary in determining Todd’s status under Buffington’s will, as the will clearly and unambiguously expresses Buffington’s intent that only Hood and Folger, the daughters born of his marriage, share as children thereunder. “In the construction of all wills, the court shall seek diligently for the intention of the testator and shall give effect to such intention as far as it may be consistent with the rules of law.” OCGA § 53-4-55. “The court must look first to the ‘four corners’ of the will to discover that intent. Cit.” American Cancer Soc’y v. Estate of Massell , 258 Ga. 717, 718 373 SE2d 741 1988. “Where the language of a will is clear . . . and can be given legal effect as it stands, the court will not, by construction, give the will a different effect. Cits.” Seymour v. Presley , 239 Ga. 572, 574-575 1 238 SE2d 347 1977.
