Following an evidentiary hearing, Eric Ferguson appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss, which motion had asserted a violation of his speedy-trial rights under the Sixth Amendment because of a 27-month delay between his arrest and the filing of his motion to dismiss. The trial court found that he had not asserted his speedy-trial right until the eve of trial and that he had shown no prejudice to his defense caused by the delay. Discerning no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling, we affirm. The undisputed facts show that on May 11, 2006, Ferguson was arrested for child molestation arising out of actions he allegedly took involving a 14-year-old girl between August and October 2005. Represented by counsel, Ferguson immediately bonded out. The State indicted him and another man for child molestation1 on January 14, 2008, and Ferguson in March 2008 moved to sever his trial from the trial of the co-defendant, which motion was granted by consent in April 2008. As trial approached, Ferguson in August 2008 moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that his speedy-trial rights under the Sixth Amendment had been violated by the delay since his arrest. Following an evidentiary hearing on the matter on September 9, 2008, the trial court on September 11 denied the motion based on its analysis of the relevant factors. Ferguson appeals.
Based on Barker v. Wingo 2 and Doggett v. United States ,3 a court should engage in a two-stage analysis when considering an accused’s motion to dismiss that asserts an alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In the first stage of the analysis, the court must determine whether the pretrial delay is sufficiently long to be considered presumptively prejudicial. The pretrial delay is measured from the accused’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation whichever comes first —see Boseman v. State 4 to the trial or, if the accused files a motion to dismiss the indictment, until the trial court denies the motion. If the delay has passed the point of presumptive prejudice, the court must proceed to the second step of the Barker-Doggett analysis, which requires the application of a delicate, context-sensitive, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the accused has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial. Citations and punctuation omitted. West v. State .5 As an appellate court, we review the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on speedy-trial grounds for abuse of discretion and defer to the trial court’s findings of fact and its weighing of disputed facts. Id. at 17 B. See State v. White .6
