In this insurance coverage action, C. Ingram Company and Chester Ingram collectively “Ingram”, as assignees of the rights of a law firm’s professional liability policy, sued the law firm’s insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company “PIIC”, for breach of contract, alleging that PIIC wrongfully denied coverage to the law firm for a legal malpractice claim that Ingram had brought against the law firm. Following a grant of summary judgment in favor of PIIC, Ingram appeals, arguing that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether PIIC properly relied on an exclusion in the policy to deny coverage and as to whether the law firm’s insurance application contained misrepresentations that entitled PIIC to rescind the policy. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. Summary judgment is only proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 c; Britt v. Kelly & Picerne, Inc. 1 “On appeal from the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we review the evidence de novo, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from the evidence are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Punctuation omitted. McCall v. Couture .2
So construed, the record shows that in July 2001, Ingram retained a law firm to file an action to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien in the amount of $651,364.37 against Johns Manville Sales Corporation “Johns Manville”. Under OCGA § 44-14-361.1 a 3, an action to foreclose on such a lien had to be filed within one year of the date it became due. Ingram’s lien had become due on August 24, 2000, and thus, any action to foreclose on that lien had to be filed on or before August 24, 2001. However, the law firm retained by Ingram did not file suit until November 6, 2001. Later that month, after becoming aware that the action had not been timely filed, Ingram, through other counsel hired to arbitrate the matter, informed the law firm that its failure would subject it to a malpractice claim. On December 12, 2001, Johns Manville filed a motion to dismiss Ingram’s foreclosure action on the ground that it had been filed after the statutory deadline. The law firm did not file a response, and on February 5, 2002, the trial court granted Johns Manville’s motion.