In 1996, Darion C. Barker was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. As a result of the admission of five prior convictions based on guilty pleas, Barker was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole pursuant to OCGA § § 16-13-30 d and 17-10-7 c. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Barker v. State , 226 Ga. App. 747 487 SE2d 494 1997. On June 30, 2008, Barker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and the illegality of his sentence of life without parole based primarily upon the alleged constitutional invalidity of the prior convictions used to enhance that sentence. After a hearing, the habeas court granted relief, finding that, with respect to a 1993 conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and 1994 convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and for possession of marijuana, the State failed to show that Barker was aware of his Boykin rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived them. The habeas court further found that Barker’s current sentence is illegal because, without those three constitutionally invalid prior convictions, he could not have been sentenced to life and would have been eligible for parole. The habeas court specifically declined to address either the validity of the remaining two prior convictions or the ineffectiveness claims, noting that the latter ultimately relate back to the same invalid convictions and illegal sentence. The Warden appeals from the habeas court’s order.
The Warden contends that the habeas court erred in reaching the merits of the illegal sentence claim on which relief was granted, because it is procedurally barred. Indeed, Barker made no objection at sentencing in 1996 that his prior guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. As Barker failed to object “on constitutional grounds to the introduction into evidence at the sentencing phase of . . . prior convictions based on . . . guilty pleas . . . , any claim that the guilty pleas were not entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently is waived. Cit.” Cits. Robinson v. State , 283 Ga. 229, 231 2 657 SE2d 822 2008. See also Bright v. State , 265 Ga. 265, 286 20 455 SE2d 37 1995; Harden v. State , 239 Ga. App. 700, 701 2 521 SE2d 829 1999. Barker did not raise the issue on direct appeal either. Barker v. State , supra. Thus, the claim that his current sentence was based on involuntary guilty pleas is barred by procedural default unless he shows sufficient reason to set aside that bar. Head v. Ferrell , 274 Ga. 399, 402 III 554 SE2d 155 2001.
