K. L. was charged in juvenile court with a number of offenses, including criminal gang activity, aggravated assault, fighting in a public place, and possessing a weapon on school grounds. Since no legal custodian was present at the initial detention hearing1 on August 17, 2009, the court reset the hearing. On August 20, 2009, K. L.’s mother completed an application for appointment of counsel and an application for bond. The application for bond was granted, and the case was again reset until an attorney was appointed. On August 27, 2009, the case convened for a 10-day adjudication,2 and K. L. admitted to the charges. After hearing from the prosecutor, K. L., K. L.’s attorney, and asking her own questions, the juvenile court judge accepted the admissions. However, the sheriff’s investigator subsequently informed the court that the investigation was still ongoing and that additional charges might be generated. The juvenile court judge then decided to treat the hearing as a detention hearing, vacated the admissions, and reset the case for a 10-day adjudication. K. L. appeals, arguing the juvenile court cannot sua sponte vacate his admissions. We agree with K. L. and reverse the juvenile court’s order.
1. K. L. first argues that, contrary to the juvenile court’s statement that a detention hearing, rather than a 10-day adjudication, was warranted because there had not previously been a finding of probable cause in the case, probable cause was found during the August 17, 2009 hearing. The state agrees, stating in its brief: “In that the Court heard the allegations and continued the case for the mother’s attendance, probable cause was found. The presiding judge acknowledged such by addressing bond at the second hearing.” We also agree. OCGA § 15-11-46.1 mandates that “restraints on the freedom of accused children prior to adjudication shall be imposed only when there is probable cause to believe that the accused child did the act of which he or she is accused and there is clear and convincing evidence that the child’s freedom should be restrained.” Since the juvenile court judge had previously placed restraints on K. L.’s freedom, by statute the judge necessarily had found probable cause. The juvenile court judge erred in determining that a 10-day adjudication was not ripe because a detention/probable cause hearing had not been held in the case.
