In this premises liability suit, Richard D. Jones appeals from the grant of summary judgment to Shelley Murphy, whom he sued after he walked through a sliding glass door at her house. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 c. A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.1 So viewed, the record shows that Murphy was in the process of moving into her newly purchased house and was visiting with friends on the evening of her first night spent at the house. The group was gathered on the back porch, and the house was unlit. Sometime between nine and ten in the evening, Jones and his fiancee dropped by the house after calling earlier in the day to show Murphy the fiancee’s engagement ring. Jones entered first and, excited to show his friends the engagement ring, walked quickly through the “pitch black” living room toward the back porch, where he saw his friends by candlelight coming from the porch. The porch was accessible by a sliding glass door fitted with a swinging metal security gate. Jones observed that the security gate was open, but, unbeknownst to Jones, the glass door was closed. Jones attempted to enter the porch and crashed through the glass door, injuring his leg. Murphy was aware that earlier in the day, two friends had bumped into the closed door as they attempted to use the door to pass from the porch into the house during daylight hours. Jones filed suit against Murphy alleging that she failed to make the sliding glass door safe or to warn him of its dangerousness. Murphy successfully moved for summary judgment, and Jones now appeals contending that summary judgment was precluded by factual issues as to Murphy’s failure to warn Jones or make the sliding glass door safe. We disagree.
It is undisputed that Jones was a licensee during his visit to Murphy’s house.2 Under OCGA § 51-3-2 b, “the owner of the premises is liable to a licensee only for willful or wanton injury.” This statutory liability for wilful or wanton injury to licensees means that the landowner . . . owes a duty to a licensee only to avoid knowingly letting him run upon a hidden peril or wilfully causing him harm . Thus, where the owner as here is aware of the licensee’s impending presence on the premises, it is usually wilful or wanton not to exercise ordinary care to prevent injuring a person who is actually known to be, or may reasonably be expected to be, within the range of a dangerous act being done or a hidden peril on one’s premises.3 Nevertheless, even assuming that Murphy had reason to know that the sliding glass door was a hidden peril posing a risk of harm to Jones, it is well established that Jones cannot recover if he could have avoided injury to himself by the exercise of ordinary care.4
