In Meadow Springs, LLC v. IH Riverdale, LLC ,1 the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed our judgment,2 in which we had affirmed an order of the trial court that granted IH Riverdale, LLC and Geoffrey Nolan’s motion for summary judgment and denied Meadow Springs, LLC’s motion for partial summary judgment in an action brought by Meadow Springs asserting claims for slander of title, tortious interference with contract, and tortious interference with economic opportunities. When faced with the Supreme Court’s reversal of one of its opinions, the Court of Appeals is required: 1 to read the Supreme Court’s opinion within the context of the opinion being reversed; 2 to determine whether any portions of the opinion being reversed were neither addressed nor considered by the Supreme Court; and 3 enter an appropriate disposition with regard to those portions that is consistent with the issue addressed and considered by the Supreme Court.3 Having conducted this analysis, and for the following reasons, we vacate our previous opinion in this case, reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to IH and Nolan, vacate the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to Meadow Springs, and remand the case for further proceedings. Meadow Springs based its claims against IH and Nolan on their acts of filing a lis pendens on real property owned by Meadow Springs in connection with another lawsuit the “prior action”, and of delivering to a third party, Regions Bank, copies of the notice of lis pendens and complaint in the prior action. The trial court granted summary judgment to IH and Nolan on the grounds that the lis pendens was valid and the filing and publication of the notice of lis pendens and complaint were subject to an absolute privilege set forth in OCGA § 51-5-8. For these reasons, the court also denied Meadow Springs’s motion for partial summary judgment.4
In reversing our judgment affirming the trial court’s order, the Supreme Court found that the prior action did not involve real property for purposes of creating a lis pendens5 and that we thus had erred in holding that the lis pendens was valid.6 But the Supreme Court’s decision did not address whether, in light of its ruling, this Court had erred in affirming the grant of summary judgment to IH and Nolan or the denial of partial summary judgment to Meadow Springs.7
