In McChesney v. IH Riverdale, LLC ,1 this Court affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment to IH Riverdale, LLC and Geoffrey Nolan in an action brought by Michael McChesney seeking a declaratory judgment on his interest in real property and damages for slander of title to that property.2 This Court based its affirmance on the decision in a related case, Meadow Springs, LLC v. IH Riverdale, LLC .3 The Supreme Court of Georgia subsequently reversed this Court’s decision in Meadow Springs ,4 and it granted a writ of certiorari and remanded this case to us in light of that reversal.5 For reasons that follow, we vacate the previous opinion in this case and reverse the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment on the slander of title claim. McChesney based his claim of slander of title against IH and Nolan on their acts of filing a lis pendens on real property in connection with another lawsuit the “prior action”, and of delivering to a third party, Regions Bank, copies of the notice of lis pendens and complaint in the prior action. The trial court granted summary judgment to IH and Nolan on the slander of title claim on the grounds that the lis pendens was valid and the filing and publication of the notice of lis pendens and complaint were subject to an absolute privilege set forth in OCGA § 51-5-8. In Meadow Springs , however, the Supreme Court found that the prior action at issue here did not involve real property for purposes of creating a lis pendens6 and that this Court thus had erred in holding that the lis pendens at issue here was valid.7 Given the Supreme Court’s ruling, we now consider whether IH and Nolan are nevertheless entitled to summary judgment on the slander of title claim.
We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.8 The evidence, which is set out more fully in the Supreme Court’s opinion,9 showed that IH and Nolan brought the prior action against Meadow Springs, LLC, among other defendants. Therein, IH and Nolan as a member of IH asserted a violation of their rights under an operating agreement for a limited liability company in which IH was a member. As described by the Supreme Court, “the complaint alleged that the defendants had deprived IH . . . of its right to invest in a real estate development and sought specific performance of an alleged option to purchase 50 of the land involved in the . . . development and the imposition of a constructive trust on the land and profits of that development.”10 The complaint included the allegation that the defendants had “exercised improper, wrongful and illegal dominion and/or control over property and property interests belonging to Nolan and IH, including . . . the real property subject to the . . . option.”
