Appellant Paul Wiggins, Jr., was found guilty of and sentenced for cruelty to children and violation of an oath of public office, and those convictions were affirmed on appeal. See Wiggins v. State , 280 Ga. 268 626 SE2d 118 2006; Wiggins v. State , 279 Ga. App. 901 633 SE2d 381 2006, and Wiggins v. State , 272 Ga. App. 414 612 SE2d 598 2005. Following his unsuccessful effort to obtain a writ of habeas corpus, appellant filed in the court of conviction a motion to strike what he alleged was an illegal sentence, asserting that the special condition of probation imposed by the trial court that required he register as a sex offender was illegal because the statute that authorized the special condition is unconstitutional. After the trial court denied the motion, he filed this appeal. Appellant contends the sentencing court’s imposition of a requirement that appellant register as a sex offender for the rest of his life is an illegal sentence because OCGA § 42-1-12 a 9 B xi, which authorizes a sentencing judge to require sex-offender registration of one who is convicted of “any conduct which, by its nature, is a sexual offense against a minor,” is unconstitutionally vague. Appellant argues the statute’s terms are not defined, the statute fails to designate the entity authorized to require an individual to register as a sex offender, and the requirement that appellant register as a sex offender violates his Sixth Amendment rights and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. He also contends the lifetime registration requirement imposes a sentence for his crime which exceeds the sentence set by the General Assembly for those crimes.
1. The District Attorney of Floyd County seeks dismissal of the appeal on the ground that appellant’s contentions were resolved adversely to him in the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1 In his habeas petition, appellant asserted several of the grounds he raised in his motion to strike illegal sentence: that the imposition of the special condition of probation made his sentence illegal, that the statute authorizing the trial court’s action was unconstitutionally vague, and that the sentence imposed violated his constitutional rights protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because the sentence exceeded the punishment authorized by OCGA § 16-5-70. The habeas court did not address the merits of appellant’s contentions, but instead determined the grounds were procedurally defaulted. OCGA § 9-14-48d.
