Jordan Jones and Goulding, Inc. “JJ&G, a professional engineering firm, designed an automobile shredding facility for Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc. Newell. JJ&G’s work was done pursuant to a “Draft Scope of Work” document and letters that it sent to Newell in August 1997, and pursuant to an agreement to prepare a concrete work platform that would control drainage around the shredding facility. After work had been completed on the project and the shredding facility became operational, in or around May 2000, the concrete platform around the facility began to fail. Over four years later, in August 2004, Newell sued JJ&G for breach of contract and professional malpractice. On August 4, 2005, JJ&G moved for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint was barred by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to actions “upon any implied promise or undertaking” contained in OCGA § 9-3-25 “all actions . . . upon any implied promise or undertaking shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues”. On September 5, 2008, the trial court denied the motion, holding that, at the very least, an issue of fact existed as to the existence of a written contract, and that, therefore, the six-year statute of limitations of OCGA § 9-3-24 applicable to written contracts applied. See id. “All actions upon simple contracts in writing shall be brought within six years after the same become due and payable”.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, even if one “assumes, arguendo, that JJ&G’s August 1997 letters to Newell, together with the Draft Scope of Work, were sufficient to constitute an enforceable, written contract between the parties, Newell’s claim was nevertheless barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitation contained in OCGA § 9-3-25.” Jordan Jones & Goulding, Inc. v. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc. , 299 Ga. App. 294, 297 682 SE2d 666 2009. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals reasoned that “OCGA § 9-3-25 applies even to those professional malpractice claims premised on the breach of a written contract for professional services” id. at 298, and, “because Newell’s breach of contract claim was premised on a written contract for professional services and calls into question the conduct of professionals in their area of expertise, it was a claim for professional malpractice, and the four-year statute of limitation applied.” Citations and punctuation omitted. Id. at 299.
