This Court granted a discretionary appeal to Henry Steven DeRyke, as the administrator of the estate of Christina Teets, DeRyke’s deceased daughter and the ex-wife of Brant Teets, to consider whether the trial court erred in ruling that Section 3 of the Teetses’ settlement agreement incorporated into their divorce decree is unambiguous and that Ms. Teets intended to grant her employee benefits to Mr. Teets, including whether Ms. Teets’s failure to change her designated beneficiaries means that she voluntarily provided benefits to Mr. Teets “at a subsequent date” within the meaning of Section 3. For the reasons which follow, we reverse and remand. Brant Teets “Ex-Husband” and Christina Teets “Ex-Wife” were married in 2003, and during the marriage, Ex-Wife was employed by the General Electric Company “GE”. Shortly after the marriage, Ex-Wife executed a “GE Benefits Plans Beneficiary Designation,” naming Ex-Husband as the 100 beneficiary of all her GE benefit plans. In August 2008, Ex-Husband, through counsel, filed a petition for divorce; it was anticipated that the divorce would be uncontested and Ex-Wife did not retain an attorney. Approximately two weeks after the filing of the divorce, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement “Agreement”, which was drafted by Ex-Husband’s attorney. Paragraph 3 of the Agreement states: Each Party expressly waives all of his or her right, title, and interest in and to any pension, profit sharing, or employee benefits plans of the other Party. This provision expressly includes 401ks, retirement plans, pension plans, and profit-sharing plans. This provision shall not prohibit a Party from voluntarily providing benefits from his or her plan to the other Party at any subsequent date. Pension, profit sharing, and employee benefit plans are defined to exclude any and all Social Security or other governmental benefits the Parties may be entitled to by virtue of marriage. The Agreement was expressly incorporated into the parties’ final judgment and decree of divorce “Decree” which was entered on September 25, 2008. Five days after the divorce, the 34-year-old Ex-Wife committed suicide; she died intestate. At the time of her death, Ex-Wife had a $200,000 life insurance death benefit and an account of accumulated securities valued at approximately $42,000 collectively, the “benefits”.1 On January 5, 2009, Ex-Husband made a claim for Ex-Wife’s benefits by filing a GE “Beneficiary Claim Form.” On January 16, 2009, DeRyke, on behalf of Ex-Wife’s estate made a claim for those same benefits. On March 17, 2009, the insurance company administering the benefits denied DeRyke’s claim because Ex-Husband was the named beneficiary of record. On April 29, 2009, Ex-Husband filed a complaint for declaratory action against DeRyke, as estate administrator, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia “federal suit”, seeking declarations that Ex-Husband should be permitted to obtain and retain all of the benefits. By letter dated May 18, 2009, counsel for DeRyke made demand, inter alia, that Ex-Husband dismiss the federal suit and comply with the waiver provisions of the Agreement incorporated into the Decree. On May 29, 2009, DeRyke filed the present state court action, an application for citation of contempt, against Ex-Husband asserting that Ex-Husband had unambiguously waived his right to retain any of Ex-Wife’s benefits by virtue of the Agreement, and that he violated the Decree by making a claim for the benefits and by failing to execute instruments necessary to give full force to the Agreement as incorporated into the Decree. Ex-Husband moved to stay the proceedings in the contempt action based on the pending federal suit. Following a hearing, on September 15, 2009, the superior court entered the order at issue, denying the application for citation of contempt.2 In so doing, the superior court found that the Agreement was “complete, clear, and unambiguous,” that Ex-Wife had the opportunity to change her employee benefit designation form but did not do so, and there was no evidence to show that Ex-Wife did not intend to confer the benefits upon Ex-Husband; therefore, there was no willful violation of the incorporated Agreement for which Ex-Husband could be held in contempt of court.3
1. It is undisputed that the benefits are subject to the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the Agreement. Therefore, the threshold question is the meaning of Paragraph 3. In that regard, it is well-established that the usual rules of contract construction are to be utilized in determining the meaning and effect of a settlement agreement incorporated into a decree of divorce, with the cardinal rule being to ascertain the intent of the parties at the time they entered the settlement agreement. Gonzalez v. Crocket , 287 Ga. 430, 433 696 SE2d 623 2010. But, when a contractual term of a settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree is clear, unambiguous, and capable of only one interpretation as written, the plain meaning of the provision must be strictly enforced. Page v. Baylard , 281 Ga. 586, 587 1 642 SE2d 14 2007. In this case, the superior court found the language at issue to be “complete, clear, and unambiguous,” and indeed it is; however, it completely, clearly, and unambiguously expresses the intent of the parties that the beneficiary spouse is releasing any and all interest in the benefits at the time of divorce. Kruse v. Todd, 260 Ga. 63 389 SE2d 488 1990. Therefore, the Agreement operated as a complete waiver of the Ex-Husband’s beneficiary designation. Young v. Stump , 294 Ga. App. 351 669 SE2d 148 2008. Even assuming arguendo, that the cited language required construction for the purpose of determining the parties’ intent, the following third sentence in Paragraph 3, states that a spouse may voluntarily provide benefits to the other spouse “at any subsequent date.” Emphasis supplied. This reinforces that the parties intended that the preceding language was to operate as an immediate release of any claim to the other’s benefits; this third sentence merely gave the parties the option to, in the future, override the blanket waiver of benefits by taking an affirmative step to provide benefits to the other spouse.
