We granted certiorari to address the propriety of the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial court did not err by making Jim Phillip Hollie’s registration as a sex offender a special condition of his probation. Hollie v. State , 298 Ga. App. 1 3 679 SE2d 47 2009. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Hollie was indicted in December 2005 on charges of aggravated child molestation, aggravated sexual battery and child molestation four counts arising out of events that occurred in July 2005. He was convicted of all charges and sentenced in February 2007 under the version of OCGA § 16-6-4 then in effect to 30 years, to serve 15 in confinement. Additionally, the sentence provided as a special probation term that Hollie “must register as a sex offender as required by OCGA § 42-1-12. The defendant is required to review the requirements of this statute with the Probation Department.”
1. It is well established that, as part of the broad discretion vested in trial judges by the probation and suspension statutes in Georgia, the appellate courts will approve “any reasonable condition imposed for probation” of sentence by the trial court “in the absence of express authority to the contrary.” State v. Collett , 232 Ga. 668, 670 208 SE2d 472 1974. See also Walker v. Brown , 281 Ga. 468 1 639 SE2d 470 2007; Pitts v. State , 206 Ga. App. 635, 637 3 426 SE2d 257 1992. OCGA § 42-1-12 contains no language expressly prohibiting a superior court from imposing sex offender registration as a probation condition. Nor do we interpret OCGA § 42-8-35 b, which sets forth certain enumerated terms and conditions of probation that may be imposed on persons like Hollie who commit criminal offenses which come within OCGA § 42-1-12,1 as being exclusive in its provisions but rather recognize that the trial court has broad discretion to impose appropriate conditions not specifically listed therein. See generally State v. Pless , 282 Ga. 58 646 SE2d 202 2007; Priest v. State , 261 Ga. 651 2 409 SE2d 657 1991. Accordingly, we find no merit in Hollie’s argument that the trial court here was not authorized to make sex offender registration a special condition of probation.2
