In 2007, Jason Jerome Moon was indicted for murder and other offenses. When the case was called for trial on April 7, 2008, Moon orally moved for a change of venue on the ground of pre-trial publicity and introduced several newspaper articles into evidence. After voir dire, the trial court granted a change of venue, but stated that the State could file a motion to reconsider, and ordered the parties either to agree on a proper venue or to bring the matter back by motion for the court to determine a proper venue. The State subsequently appealed from a separate order granting a motion to suppress Moon’s pre-trial statements, which this Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. State v. Moon , 285 Ga. 55 673 SE2d 255 2009. The State then filed a motion to reconsider the change of venue, which a different judge granted on October 1, 2009 on the ground that “there was never a written motion filed as is required by statute, and no evidentiary hearing was ever conducted.” The trial court also held that the State’s appeal acted as a supersedeas, and that the order changing venue was collateral and the State was not required to appeal it at the same time as the suppression order. The trial court certified its order for immediate review, and Moon appeals pursuant to our grant of his application for interlocutory appeal.
Moon contends that the trial court was not authorized to grant the motion for reconsideration, because it was not made until after expiration of the term of court in which the order changing venue was entered. In civil cases, ” ‘an interlocutory ruling does not pass from the control of the court at the end of the term if the cause remains pending.’ Cits.” Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell , 258 Ga. App. 51, 56 3 572 SE2d 664 2002. This principle is required by the Civil Practice Act CPA. OCGA § 9-11-6 c. In criminal cases, however, the pre-CPA rule continues to apply, and a trial court’s inherent power to revoke interlocutory rulings still ceases with the end of the term. Pledger v. State , 193 Ga. App. 588, 589 2 a 388 SE2d 425 1989. Compare Rooney v. State , 217 Ga. App. 850, 852 459 SE2d 601 1995 involving reconsideration of a bond order and distinguishing Pledger . Indeed, this is the general common law rule which applied in federal courts before terms of court were abolished therein. United States v. Breit , 754 F2d 526, 530 4th Cir. 1985.
