Seventy-one-year-old William M. Vaughan was admitted to Kennestone Hospital in 2002 for weakness and ataxia1 and died several weeks later after hitting his head on the bathroom door of his hospital room. His surviving spouse and the administrator of his estate, Nancy R. Vaughan “Vaughan”, filed this medical malpractice action against WellStar Health System, Inc. d/b/a WellStar Kennestone Hospital “WellStar”. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of WellStar and Vaughan appeals, contending that the trial court erred in excluding Vaughan’s expert’s affidavit; in denying her motion to modify the scheduling order; and in granting WellStar’s motion to exclude Vaughan’s new expert’s affidavit. We affirm. To prevail at summary judgment . . . , the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff’s case. If there is no evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to any essential element of plaintiff’s claim, that claim tumbles like a house of cards. All of the other disputes of fact are rendered immaterial. . . . If the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.2 We review de novo a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, construing the evidence most favorably to the nonmovant.3 So viewed, the evidence shows that on July 6, 2002, Mr. Vaughan was admitted to Kennestone Hospital with a diagnosis of weakness and ataxia. According to the record, hospital staff gave Mr. Vaughan a fall prevention score of 30, as of July 26, 2002. Lillian Holloway, the nurse assigned to care for Mr. Vaughan, testified that he was a low risk for falls but that an “out of bed with assistance” order had been in place when Mr. Vaughan initially was admitted to the hospital. That order was not in place at 12:30 a.m. on July 28, 2002, when Holloway noticed a small hematoma on the left side of Mr. Vaughan’s head. Mr. Vaughan told Holloway that he had gotten up to go the bathroom and fell into the door frame. Holloway testified that after discovering the hematoma, she performed a neurological assessment and found Mr. Vaughan’s condition unchanged. About an hour later, Mr. Vaughan called the nurse’s station, complaining of a headache. Holloway responded to his room five minutes later and found him unresponsive. Mr. Vaughan was taken to the intensive care unit and underwent a craniotomy. His condition deteriorated, and he died on August 3, 2002, without regaining consciousness. On April 23, 2004, Vaughan sued WellStar on behalf of her husband’s estate. Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1, Vaughan submitted the affidavit of Charles Horton, R. N., along with her complaint. Horton’s deposition was taken on March 3, 2006, and on July 12, 2007, Vaughan notified the trial court that Horton would be unavailable to testify at trial. On September 5, 2007, the trial court entered a scheduling order, ordering that all experts be identified by September 14, 2007, and that all expert depositions be completed by October 16, 2007. On September 12, 2007, Vaughan identified a new expert, Mitzi Weekley, R. N., B. S. N. Weekley was deposed on October 4, 2007.
On July 29, 2008, WellStar moved to exclude Weekley’s testimony, contending that she failed to qualify as an expert because she had not been engaged in the active teaching or practice of nursing for three of the five years preceding the date of the alleged negligence, as required by OCGA § 24-9-67.1 c. WellStar also filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment. On February 6, 2009, Vaughan moved the trial court to modify the scheduling order to provide her with additional time to identify a third expert. Vaughan explained that the motion was necessary because of “unexpected problems with Weekley’s qualifications”; that a new expert had been identified; and that the new expert affidavit would be filed in conjunction with Vaughan’s brief in response to WellStar’s supplemental motion for summary judgment.
