After a jury trial, Danilo Hernandez was convicted of two counts of child molestation.1 Hernandez appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the jury was improperly instructed on the element of intent, and arguing that the court improperly admitted character evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm. 1. Hernandez argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We disagree. When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, the proper standard for review is whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, giving deference to the jury’s determination on the proper weight and credibility to be given the evidence.2 Viewed in this light, the evidence presented at trial establishes that one night in February 2007, Hernandez was drinking heavily and entered the bedroom of his nine-year-old daughter, K. H. Hernandez removed K. H.’s underwear and touched her “privates” with his hand. K. H. also felt Hernandez’s “privates” on her “privates.”3 K. H. testified that something like “pee” came out of Hernandez’s “private,” and Hernandez told her not to tell anyone what happened. K. H. told her mother about the abuse the next morning. K. H.’s mother, Luz, did not immediately report the abuse because she was afraid that Hernandez would harm her, but in May 2007, Hernandez was hospitalized for suicidal thoughts, and Luz reported the incident to the family pastor; thereafter, officials were notified of the allegation.
Child molestation occurs when the defendant “does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person,”4 as indicted in this case, “by placing his penis on the vagina of” K. H. and “by placing his hand on the vagina of” K. H. The facts as shown above support the jury’s guilty verdict on the two child molestation charges.5 Nevertheless, Hernandez contends that the evidence was insufficient, challenging the veracity of K. H.’s and Luz’s testimonies and pointing to inconsistencies between K. H.’s testimony and her statements made to Luz and other witnesses during the investigation of the incident; however, “resolving evidentiary conflicts and inconsistencies, and assessing witness credibility, are the province of the factfinder, not this Court.”6 The jury determined that K. H.’s testimony was credible,7 “and we will not disturb the jury’s findings on appeal.”8
