In this case involving a permanent protective order prohibiting Jonathan Huggins from stalking Karen Boyd, Huggins appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside the order, arguing that the trial court had no personal jurisdiction over him. Because it is undisputed that Huggins a South Carolina resident engaged in the stalking conduct only outside Georgia, and because it is further undisputed that Huggins engaged in no other conduct persistent or otherwise in Georgia, we must reverse. Construed in favor of the trial court’s bench-trial findings, Vrana v. Augusta-Richmond County ,1 the evidence shows that for years, Huggins had from South Carolina repeatedly, in a harassing and intimidating manner, contacted Boyd. He similarly contacted her friends, students, and professional colleagues at Georgia Tech with critiques about Boyd, leading to the entry of a twelve-month protective order by a Fulton County Superior Court enjoining such contact. When this order expired and Boyd took a position at the University of Georgia in Clarke County, Huggins renewed his harassing contacts via out-of-state emails this time to Boyd’s friends and colleagues at UGA, causing Boyd to petition for a permanent protective order in Clarke County Superior Court to enjoin such contacts. Huggins was served at his South Carolina address with the petition, with a copy of a temporary protective order, and with a notice of a hearing on the request for a permanent protective order scheduled for April 23, 2007.
Huggins did not appear at the April 23 hearing, and a permanent protective order against stalking was entered that same day, enjoining Huggins from contacting Boyd or her immediate family, and from contacting Boyd’s friends and colleagues regarding Boyd. Two years later on May 4, 2009, Huggins moved to set aside the order on the grounds that the Clarke County court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and that the order was overly broad. Following a hearing2 at which it was undisputed and which point Boyd concedes on appeal that all of Huggins’s email contacts originated physically from outside Georgia, the court held that nevertheless, it had personal jurisdiction over Huggins because he had engaged in such a lengthy and persistent course of conduct in contacting Boyd and her friends and colleagues. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to set aside, giving rise to this discretionary appeal.
