Shaquan Lattimore’s motion to dismiss his indictment on the ground that he was not afforded a speedy trial was granted by the trial court, and the State appeals. See OCGA § 5-7-1 a 1. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Bryan Thompson was shot and killed on August 27, 2004; that same day, Lattimore was arrested on suspicion of murdering him. On September 10, 2004, at a hearing, the trial court found that there was not probable cause to support a charge of malice murder against Lattimore, but there was probable cause to support charges of involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct. The court set bond, and Lattimore was released from custody on September 12, 2004. On June 30, 2006, he was indicted on one count of malice murder for the 2004 killing. During a case management conference on October 27, 2006, the prosecutor stated that the charge of malice murder was inappropriate and that the State intended to re-indict the case. On several occasions between October 2006 and February 2008, various prosecutors informed Lattimore’s counsel that the State intended to re-indict Lattimore on a lesser charge. The case was on the trial calendar in both May and August 2007 but was not reached either time, and was again on a trial calendar for February 7, 2008. On February 5, 2008, the State re-indicted Lattimore on charges of malice murder, felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On July 17, 2009, Lattimore moved to dismiss the indictment for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, citing the Constitutions of the United States and Georgia. See U. S. Const. Amends. VI & XIV; Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI a.
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss based on a violation of the right to a speedy trial found in the Federal and State Constitutions is reviewed under the analysis found in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U. S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972. Ruffin v. State , 284 Ga. 52, 55 2 663 SE2d 189 2008. In Barker v. Wingo . . ., the Supreme Court of the United States identified four factors to be considered by a court in determining whether an accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. . . . a the length of the delay, b the reason for the delay, c the defendant’s assertion of his right, and d the prejudice to the defendant. 407 U.S. at 530. The Supreme Court further stated that it regarded none of the factors as either a necessary or sufficient condition to a finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial but rather that the factors should be considered together in a balancing test of the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant. Cit. State v. Redding , 274 Ga. 831, 831-832 561 SE2d 79 2002. “The question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that Lattimore’s speedy trial rights were violated. Cit.” Id. at 832.
