Curtis Lane Taylor appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to two counts of child molestation. Taylor contends that his trial counsel failed to advise him that entering a plea of guilty to child molestation would necessitate that he comply with the requirements of Georgia’s sex offender registry statute and participate in a sex offender treatment program. As such, Taylor contends that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court’s order to the extent that it held that Taylor’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to advise Taylor that he would have to participate in a sex offender treatment program. However, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Padilla v. Kentucky , __U. S.__ 130 SC 1473, 176 LE2d 284 2010, we agree with Taylor that it is constitutionally deficient for counsel not to advise his client that pleading guilty will make him subject to the sex offender registration requirements. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order to the extent that it held otherwise and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The record reflects that on June 18, 2007, Taylor entered a guilty plea to two counts of child molestation under a negotiated plea agreement with a recommended sentence of ten years, to serve one year in confinement and the remaining nine years on probation. During the plea colloquy, the trial court informed Taylor that if he proceeded to trial, he was entitled to a presumption of innocence, and that the state would have to prove his guilt on the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court further apprised Taylor of the maximum possible sentence he could receive and that by pleading guilty he was waiving his rights to a jury trial, to cross-examine witnesses, to subpoena witnesses on his own behalf, to testify or present other evidence at trial, and not to incriminate himself. Additionally, the trial court pointed out to Taylor that under the negotiated plea agreement, he would be subject to certain special conditions of probation, including that he receive “psychological screening and treatment as recommended” by the probation office, such that “if they recommend treatment to you as a result of the screening, you have to comply with the recommendation.” Taylor stated that he understood the terms of the negotiated plea agreement, that he desired to plead guilty to the charges, that he had not been coerced or threatened into making the decision, and that he freely and voluntarily had decided to enter the plea. The trial court accepted the negotiated plea and imposed the recommended sentence.
On June 27, 2009, Taylor met with his assigned probation officer, who explained to Taylor that he would be subject to the requirements imposed by Georgia’s sex offender registry statute, OCGA § 42-1-12, upon his release from confinement. The probation officer also explained to Taylor that under the sex offender treatment program administered by the state probation office, he would be required to “attend and participate fully and pay for any counseling or treatment deemed necessary by the probation office.” Moreover, the officer informed Taylor that as part of the screening process and any recommended treatment, he would be required to submit to polygraph tests.