Brooks v. State

The 7-year delay between the grant of the defendant's motion for a new trial and the filing of his plea in bar did not raise a presumption of actual prejudice because the defendant did not timely assert his speedy trial right and the defense contributed to the delay.

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After a jury trial in June 2001, Anthony Brooks was convicted of battery, rape and false imprisonment. Brooks moved for a new trial, and on October 22, 2002, the trial court granted the motion due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On November 15, 2002, Brooks’ lawyer filed a request for permission to file a speedy trial demand. On November 20, 2002, the lawyer withdrew and a new attorney was appointed to represent Brooks. On or about that same day, Brooks was released from confinement on bond. In August or September 2003, the case appeared on a trial calendar. However, the case did not proceed to trial, and several months later Brooks’ attorney withdrew and another lawyer was appointed to represent him. While out on bond, Brooks was twice arrested and charged with felony offenses unrelated to the original charges for which he was tried in 2001. In 2004, he was charged with and convicted of possession of cocaine. In 2007, he was indicted for aggravated battery, a case that is still pending. Also, several years after the motion for new trial was granted in the 2001 case, the original trial judge passed away, and the case was assigned to two different judges.

On September 30, 2009, Brooks filed a plea in bar and motion for discharge and acquittal, claiming a denial of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the plea in bar and motion. Brooks appeals, contending that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous because his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by the lapse of approximately seven years since his motion for a new trial was granted.

Brooks v. State

The 7-year delay between the grant of the defendant's motion for a new trial and the filing of his plea in bar did not raise a presumption of actual prejudice because the defendant did not timely assert his speedy trial right and the defense contributed to the delay.

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