The state appeals the trial court’s grant of the motion filed by Octavius Orlando Sarden to suppress the cocaine seized from his car. The trial court suppressed the cocaine based upon its conclusion that the search of the car was unconstitutional because it was not supported by a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. We conclude, however, that the search of Sarden’s car was authorized under the “automobile exception,” which does not require a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances in order for the search to be valid under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse. Because the trial court sits as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion to suppress . . . , its findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to a jury verdict and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support them. When we review a trial court’s decision on such a motion to exclude evidence, we construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment, and we adopt the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility unless they are clearly erroneous. When the evidence is uncontroverted and no question of witness credibility is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review. With mixed questions of fact and law, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and witness credibility unless clearly erroneous, but independently applies the legal principles to the facts. Citations and punctuation omitted. State v. Tousley , 271 Ga. App. 874 611 SE2d 139 2005. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, the evidence showed that the City of Commerce Police Department had issued a “be-on-the-lookout” “BOLO” advisory for Sarden, who was wanted on four outstanding felony warrants. On September 14, 2008, an officer who was aware of the BOLO advisory was on routine patrol when Sarden drove by him at a highway intersection. After confirming the existence of the outstanding warrants, the officer watched as Sarden drove to a nearby convenience store and parked his car. Radioing for backup, the officer followed Sarden to the store. The officer then entered the store behind Sarden and placed him under arrest without incident. As the officer escorted the handcuffed Sarden to his patrol vehicle, a second officer arrived and inquired as to which car belonged to Sarden. The first officer pointed out Sarden’s car parked in front of the store.
The second officer approached Sarden’s car and looked through the front passenger side window. He observed, in plain view on the center console, a clear baggy containing a white powdery substance that he suspected was crack cocaine. The second officer, who had many years of experience and who worked over 20 cases involving crack cocaine every year, was familiar with the appearance of the drug. After seeing the suspected crack cocaine, the second officer reached through the partially opened window, unlocked the passenger door, and retrieved the baggy from the car. It is undisputed that the officer did not obtain Sarden’s consent to search the car or a search warrant prior to seizing the baggy of suspected crack cocaine.
