Following a jury trial, Steven Anthony Donald appeals his convictions for felony murder and possession of a firearm,1 contending that, under the facts of this case, the trial court improperly instructed the jurors that “juries are not bound to believe testimony as to facts incredible, impossible, or imperatively improbable.” For the reasons set forth below, we agree and reverse. 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that, on the evening of October 21, 1998, the victim, John Mullinax, came to the trailer home that Donald shared with his fiance, who was the victim’s sister. Once there, Mullinax started arguing with Donald regarding an unpaid debt while standing outside of the trailer Donald and his fiance inhabited. At one point, Mullinax followed Donald into the trailer, and, after Donald’s fiance told Mullinax that she did not wish to speak to him, Donald retrieved a gun and ordered Mullinax to leave. Mullinax did not do so, and Donald opened fire. Donald ultimately shot Mullinax four times, killing him. After shooting Mullinax, Donald placed a knife in Mullinax’s hand, and he lied to police that Mullinax had been brandishing the weapon prior to the shooting. Donald later admitted this lie, and he maintained that he planted the knife because he did not believe that police would believe that he acted in self-defense. At trial, self-defense was Donald’s sole basis for fighting the charges against him. He testified that he was afraid of Mullinax based on prior encounters, that Mullinax was enraged and intoxicated, that he was just trying to protect himself and his fiance whom Mullinax had recently threatened with physical harm, and that he believed that Mullinax was going to try to take the gun from him at the time of the shooting. The jurors, however, rejected Donald’s defense, basing their verdict on the remaining evidence which was sufficient to enable them to determine that Donald was guilty of the crimes with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560 1979.
2. Based on the facts of this case, however, the trial court erred by giving the following charge to the jurors: I charge you that when the accused testifies, he at once becomes the same as any other witness, and his credibility is to be tested by and subjected to the same tests as are legally applied to any other witness. In determining the degree of credibility that should be afforded his testimony, the jury may take into consideration the fact that he is interested in the result of the prosecution. I charge you that juries are not bound to believe testimony as to facts incredible, impossible, or imperatively improbable. This charge stems from language in Patton v. State , 117 Ga. 230 43 SE 533 1903. There, this Court held:
