This case involves Richard Stone and Anita Stone’s petition to adopt two-year-old A. S., and Jerimi Parker’s objection to the adoption petition.1 The record shows that A. S. was born on July 23, 2006. A. S. was placed with the Stones on July 28, 2006, where he has resided without interruption. On May 22, 2008, nunc pro tunc to September 17, 2007, A. S.’s legal mother’s parental rights were terminated by court order. Also on May 22, 2008, A. S.’s purported biological father signed a “Surrender of Parental Rights/Final Release for Adoption” and an “Acknowledgment of Surrender of Rights” in favor of Parker, his purported half-brother. Subsequently, the Stones filed a Petition for Adoption on May 27, 2008. Parker responded, objecting to the petition. He later filed a motion to dismiss the adoption petition, and the Stones filed a motion to quash all pleadings filed by Parker. The parties agreed that the first issue to be addressed by the trial court should be whether Parker had standing to object to the adoption, since a lack of standing would be dispositive of the other issues in the case. The Stones argued that because A. S.’s biological father never legitimated A. S. and became A. S.’s legal father, the biological father had no rights to transfer to Parker, and, therefore, Parker lacked standing to object to the adoption petition. Parker argued that even if he did not receive any legal rights to A. S. through the biological father’s purported surrender of parental rights, he still had standing to object to the adoption petition under OCGA § 19-8-15 because he is a blood relative of the child. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the Stones’ motion to quash and dismissing Parker from the action on the basis that he lacked standing to object to the petition to adopt because 1 he had obtained no legal rights to A. S. through the biological father’s surrender of parental rights, and 2 OCGA § 19-8-15 did not apply because A. S.’s mother was still alive. The trial court also issued a final judgment granting the Stones’ petition for adoption.
Parker contends the trial court erred in quashing his pleadings, dismissing him from the adoption proceeding, and granting the Stones’ adoption petition. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the trial court’s order quashing Parker’s pleadings and dismissing him from the adoption action. We also vacate the trial court’s final judgment and decree of adoption and remand the case for the trial court to consider Parker’s objections and the best interests of A. S.
