This appeal concerns a dispute over a municipal ordinance promulgated by the appellee City of Riverdale “the City”. Section 38 of the City’s charter provides that it “shall have full control and full power and authority to regulate . . . and control the streets, sidewalks, lanes, alleys, squares and lands of the City of Riverdale as provided by the laws of the State of Georgia.” Based on this charter provision, the City adopted local ordinance 17-2007, Art. II, Sec. 42-33 which provides in pertinent part that “it is unlawful for either the occupant or the owner of property . . . to have . . . on or near . . .a sidewalk or right-of-way . . . any overgrown grass or weeds of a height of six inches or more or any unkempt vegetation.” On May 14, 2009, the City cited appellant Linda Gasses for violating this local ordinance when she failed to cut the high grass on the portion of her property adjacent to a public right-of-way. Just prior to the trial of the ordinance violation in municipal court, the Gasses filed a declaratory judgment action and action for preliminary/permanent injunction in the Superior Court of Clayton County, alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The City filed a motion to dismiss the action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Meanwhile, the municipal court convicted appellant of violating the ordinance and fined her $150. Appellant sought to appeal the conviction by filing a writ of certiorari to the superior court.1 However, because of her failure to act and continued noncompliance, appellant received additional citations and fines. On December 10, 2009, in the action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, holding that the Gasses had an adequate remedy at law through the filing of a writ of certiorari. The trial court also considered the validity of the ordinance, finding on the merits that it was constitutional, did not exceed the City’s police power, and did not constitute involuntary servitude. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 1. Appellant contends it was error to dismiss her action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief based on the trial court’s conclusion that she had an adequate remedy at law. Although the trial court dismissed the action, citing in part the failure to pursue a petition for certiorari, we need not address this allegation because the trial court considered and resolved the issues raised in the declaratory judgment/injunctive action on the merits. Accordingly, there is no basis to reverse the trial court on this point.
2. Appellant alleges the ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates due process and equal protection by forcing elderly homeowners to perform the duties of the City’s public works employees and by treating owners differently from non-owners who occupy the property. We disagree. An ordinance under constitutional attack carries with it a presumption of constitutionality cit., and we have a duty to construe the legislation so as to uphold it as constitutional, if that is possible. Cit. Only when it is established that the legislative enactment “manifestly infringes upon a constitutional provision or violates the rights of the people” will the statute be declared unconstitutional. Cit. Old South Duck Tours v. Mayor & Alderman of City of Savannah , 272 Ga. 869 2 535 SE2d 751 2000. Where, as here, there is neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right at stake, a rational relationship test is applied to determine whether the statute violates substantive due process or equal protection. Id. at 872; State of Georgia v. Old South Amusements, Inc. , 275 Ga. 274 2 564 SE2d 710 2002; Love v. State , 271 Ga. 398 2, 517 SE2d 53 1999. That is, the statute must bear a direct relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose to pass constitutional muster. Love v. State , supra, 271 Ga. at 400. See also City of Atlanta v. Watson , 267 Ga. 185 1 475 SE2d 896 1996.
