This Court granted Delma Cecil Phagan’s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Hall County denying Phagan’s petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the petition was untimely filed. The issue is whether the statutory provisions that allow for the renewal of civil actions after dismissal, namely OCGA § 9-2-60 b & c1 and OCGA § 9-11-41 e,2 apply to habeas corpus actions. Concluding that they apply to the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this case, we reverse and remand. Phagan originally filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in October 1999, challenging his 1996 conviction for statutory rape. See Phagan v. State , 268 Ga. 272 486 SE2d 876 1997. An order granting Phagan’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the petition without prejudice was granted on May 27, 2003. See OCGA § 9-11-41 a.3 Phagan, pro se, filed a new petition for a writ of habeas corpus on June 17, 2003. No order was entered in that case for a period of five years and the petition was dismissed by operation of law on June 17, 2008. Phagan paid the costs and on December 15, 2008, filed, pro se, the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a recommencement of his 2003 action. On June 8, 2009, the habeas court denied Phagan’s petition, expressly “adopting” the State’s arguments in its motion to dismiss and specifying that the basis for the dismissal was that the petition was not timely filed under OCGA § 9-14-42 c.4 During the hearing in the matter, the habeas court declared that there was conflict between the specific limitation for habeas corpus found in OCGA § 9-14-42c, and the general renewal statutes in the Civil Practice Act “CPA”; therefore, OCGA § 9-14-42 c would control.
Both the reasoning and conclusion by the habeas court are flawed. The analysis for determining whether the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is temporally saved by the referenced renewal provisions of the CPA properly begins with the recognition that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding. Schofield v. Meders , 280 Ga. 865, 870 5 632 SE2d 369 2006. As such, this Court has readily affirmed that the CPA is to be applied in habeas corpus proceedings in matters of pleading and practice. Roberts v. Cooper , 286 Ga. 657, 661 691 SE2d 875 2010; Nguyen v. State, 282 Ga. 483, 486 2 651 SE2d 681 2007; State v. Jaramillo , 279 Ga. 691, 693 2, 620 SE2d 798 2005. A complaint or petition is by statutory definition a “pleading” within the confines of the CPA. OCGA § 9-11-7 a.5 Indeed, this Court has observed that notice pleading, which is the hallmark of and prescribed by the CPA, is especially appropriate in the situation of a pro se petition, and such a pro se proceeding is common in the case of a post-conviction petition for habeas corpus relief. Rolland v. Martin , 281 Ga. 190, 191 637 SE2d 23 2006.
