Following the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the offense of voluntary manslaughter,1 Jake Tomlin appeals, arguing that there was no factual basis for his plea and that his plea was not entered voluntarily or intelligently because he was not informed that intent was an element of the offense. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. The record shows that in 2003, Tomlin was charged with one count of murder, one count of felony murder, and one count of aggravated assault in an indictment that alleged that he stabbed his estranged wife to death with a knife. At his plea hearing on November 15, 2005, Tomlin maintained his innocence but pled guilty under North Carolina v. Alford 2 to voluntary manslaughter and received a negotiated sentence of 20 years with 15 to serve. Less than one month later, Tomlin filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. One week later, Tomlin’s trial counsel also filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, in which Tomlin again alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and in which Tomlin requested that new counsel be appointed. Subsequently, the trial court appointed new counsel, and thereafter the court held a hearing on Tomlin’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which it denied. This appeal followed.
“After sentence is pronounced, withdrawal of a guilty plea is allowed only to correct a manifest injustice, and the trial court’s refusal to allow withdrawal will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Punctuation omitted. McDowell v. State .3 An example of manifest injustice warranting withdrawal is when a guilty plea is entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges. State v. Evans .4 “When a defendant so challenges the validity of his guilty plea, the State bears the burden of showing that the plea was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Punctuation omitted. McDowell , supra, 282 Ga. App. at 755.