Henry E. Smith Testator died in 1970. In pertinent part, Item 4 of his will disposed of his real property as follows: I will, bequeath and devise all real estate . . . which I own at the time of my death to my son . . . Will Henry Smith Life Tenant for and during his natural life with the remainder to my four daughters . . ., my grandson Dean Smith and any child or children of Life Tenant who shall together take an equal part with my . . . four daughters and . . . Dean Smith, share and share alike. If any of the four . . . daughters are deceased, the share of the deceased daughter is to go to her child or children, share and share alike; and in the event that . . . Dean Smith pre-deceases . . . Life Tenant, then his share shall go to my . . . four . . . daughters and to any child or children of Life Tenant in the proportion set out to them herein above. . . . Life Tenant did not ever have any biological children. In 2004, however, a superior court entered a final judgment and decree of adoption, declaring Steven Dewayne Cowart Appellee, who was 32 years old, “to be the adopted child of Life Tenant, capable of inheriting his estate according to law.” Life Tenant died in 2005. In 2007, two remaindermen filed a petition for construction of Testator’s will and for declaratory judgment, disputing Appellee’s entitlement to a remainder interest. The other remaindermen generally admitted and adopted the allegations of the petition. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee and against all of the other parties Appellants. The superior court found that the four corners of Testator’s will did not express any intention to exclude adopted children when he devised a one-sixth remainder interest to “any child or children” of Life Tenant, and that there is no genuine issue of material fact in that regard. Relying on Warner v. First Nat. Bank , 242 Ga. 661 251 SE2d 511 1978, the superior court further found that the law applicable at the time of Testator’s death in 1970 governs the construction of his will and that, under that law, Appellee as an adopted adult “child” of Life Tenant would take under the will of his non-blood related ancestor by adoption. Appellants appeal from that order.
“Testator’s ‘will expressed no intention regarding the law to be used in its construction; therefore, the law in effect at his death governs.’ Cit.” Haley v. Regions Bank , 277 Ga. 85, 89 2 586 SE2d 633 2003. See also Warner v. First Nat. Bank , supra at 664 1. The law in effect at the time of Testator’s death in 1970 extended the inheritance rights of an adopted adult beyond the adopting parent and provided a rule for interpretation of wills, as follows: Said adopted adult shall be considered in all respects as if he or she were a son or daughter of natural bodily issue of the adopting parent . . .; and shall be deemed a natural child of such parent to inherit under the laws of descent and distribution in the absence of a will and to take under the provisions of any instrument of testamentary gift, bequest, devise or legacy unless expressly excluded therefrom. Ga. L. 1967, pp. 803, 804-805, § 1 amending Code Section 74-420 of the Code of 1933, which was the predecessor of OCGA § § 19-8-19 a 2, 19-8-21 b. Therefore, under the law in effect at Testator’s death, “an adopted adult person would be deemed a natural child under a testamentary devise unless expressly excluded therefrom. Cit.” Faulk v. Faulk , 240 Ga. 373, 375 240 SE2d 848 1977.
