Thomas Green was arrested on August 5, 2005, for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He was not formally accused by the District Attorney until January 29, 2008. On May 5, 2008, Green filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. The trial court denied the motion, and Green appealed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. There are two benchmark cases used in deciding all constitutional speedy trial claims under the Sixth Amendment and the Georgia Constitution: Doggett v. United States 1 and Barker v. Wingo .2 These two cases detail the analysis that courts must follow. First, the court must determine whether the interval from the accused’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation to the trial is sufficiently long to be considered “presumptively prejudicial.”3 If not, the speedy trial claim fails. If, however, the delay is deemed presumptively prejudicial, the court must then apply a four-factor balancing test to determine whether the accused has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial. The four factors include a whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, b whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, c whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and d whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the delay.4 These factors do not constitute an exhaustive list and must be considered together with other relevant circumstances.5 And, we will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on a constitutional speedy trial claim absent an abuse of discretion.6
1. Green first asserts the trial court failed to make a finding whether the delay between his arrest and the motion was sufficiently long to be considered “presumptively prejudicial.” However, such a specific finding was not necessary in this case. It has been well-established that any delay over a year is presumptively prejudicial.7 Here, a period of nearly three years passed between the time of Green’s arrest and the time a hearing was held on the motion to dismiss. Thus, the delay in the present case was presumptively prejudicial. The trial court recognized this fact and applied the four-factor balancing test to determine whether Green had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial.
