Antone Dennard Leonard was charged with one count of robbery, three counts of identity fraud, one count of financial transaction card fraud, two counts of financial transaction card theft, and one count of violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. On October 31, 2005, Leonard entered into a plea agreement that reduced the robbery count to theft by taking and dismissed the financial transaction card fraud count. Leonard pled guilty to the remaining counts and was sentenced. Leonard subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied by the trial court on February 13, 2006. On April 11, 2006, Leonard moved for an out-of-time appeal, which the trial court also denied. We reversed that decision, however, finding that Leonard was entitled to an out-of-time appeal.1 In this appeal, we address the merits of Leonard’s out-of-time appeal. Because we find no error, we affirm Leonard’s convictions. It is well established that once a sentence has been entered, a guilty plea may only be withdrawn to correct a manifest injustice.2 While the test for manifest injustice varies from case to case, examples include cases where a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel or where the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges.3 Absent a manifest abuse of discretion, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be disturbed.4
In his appeal, Leonard admits that he had four previous felony guilty pleas and knew he would be sentenced as a repeat offender. He also admits that the trial court’s sentence did not exceed the negotiated plea cap and that the trial court advised him of his right to a trial by jury, presumption of innocence, right to confront witnesses, right to subpoena witnesses, and right to testify or remain silent. Leonard argues, however, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea because a his attorney did not advise him about recidivist treatment, b he did not realize he would be sentenced for three counts of identity fraud, c he was told he would serve five years rather than seven, and d he was not informed that the state had to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The record in this case belies Leonard’s assertions.
