Following a jury trial, Michael Harvey Hornsby was convicted of following another vehicle too closely.1 He appeals, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. Hornsby also contends that the trial court erred in conducting voir dire and in denying his motion to strike a juror for cause. We affirm, for reasons that follow. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,2 the evidence shows that on December 23, 2006, Officer Clay McCullough observed Hornsby following another vehicle at a distance of approximately 5 to 10 feet while traveling approximately 20 to 25 miles per hour. Officer McCullough stopped Hornsby and ultimately issued him a written citation for following too closely. After a jury trial, Hornsby was convicted of following too closely, and this appeal followed.
1. Hornsby asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to: question two potential jurors to determine whether their familiarity with the officers resulted in bias or prejudice; object to the testimony of a particular witness; and object to the admission of a videotape depicting the events after Hornsby was stopped. However, Hornsby has waived his right to challenge the ineffectiveness of counsel. It is axiomatic that a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel must be asserted at the earliest practicable moment. This requires that the claim be raised before appeal if the opportunity to do so is available; that the ability to raise the issue on motion for new trial represents such an opportunity; and that the failure to seize that opportunity is a procedural bar to raising the issue at a later time.3 Here, Hornsby was found guilty on May 13, 2008, and his subsequent sentence was entered on May 27, 2008.4 His trial counsel was replaced by appellate counsel, who, on June 9, 2008, filed both a notice of appearance and a notice of appeal. Neither trial counsel nor appellate counsel filed a motion for new trial asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, although appellate counsel could have done so when he filed the notice of appeal.5 Because “appellate counsel was appointed prior to the filing of the notice of appeal, Hornsby is procedurally barred from raising for the first time on appeal the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel.”6
