Laquandra Stegall appeals her conviction on two counts of cruelty to children,1 asserting that the trial court erred in denying her motion to either declare a mistrial based on the admission of hearsay statements made by one of Stegall’s victims or, in the alternative, to strike such hearsay testimony. Finding that the trial court properly admitted the hearsay statements pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-16, we affirm. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, Daugherty v. State, 2 the record shows that Stegall was indicted on three counts of cruelty to children. Count One of the indictment charged Stegall with abusing the daughter of her live-in boyfriend, while Counts Two and Three charged Stegall with abusing her own daughter. Both of the girls were three-years-old at the time of the abuse and, sometime after Stegall’s indictment, the State placed both of the victims into foster care. At trial, the girls’ foster mother testified as to statements Stegall’s daughter had made to her, that Stegall and her live-in-boyfriend had each abused both of the girls. The State also presented Stegall’s daughter as a witness, but she refused to answer questions from either the prosecutor or from defense counsel.3 Defense counsel thereafter moved for a mistrial or, in the alternative, to have the foster mother’s testimony regarding the hearsay statements of Stegall’s daughter stricken from the record. The trial court denied that motion, and the jury subsequently convicted Stegall on Counts One and Three of the indictment but acquitted her of Count Two. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict, and this appeal followed.
OCGA § 24-3-16 provides, in relevant part, that “a statement made by a child under the age of 14 years describing any act of . . . physical abuse performed . . . on the child by another . . . is admissible in evidence by the testimony of the person or persons to whom made if the child is available to testify in the proceedings. . . .” On appeal, Stegall argues that her daughter’s refusal to answer questions at trial meant she was unavailable to testify within the meaning of this statute. This Court, however, has previously considered and rejected identical arguments in a number of cases, beginning with Bright v. State .4
