Ladontae Rashad Robertson appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the offenses of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Robertson’s motion to withdraw, we affirm. On August 2, 2005, Robertson was indicted, along with co-defendant Wendell Lamar Hebreard, on charges of armed robbery Count 1 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime Count 2. The indictment alleged that on June 23, 2005, when Robertson was 17 years old, he and Hebreard took a tan Nine West purse and a pink wallet from their female victim by use of a firearm. On July 12, 2006, following a hearing at which he was represented by counsel, Robertson entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to both counts and was sentenced on Count 1 to twenty years, sixteen to serve in confinement, and on Count 2 to five years probation, to be served consecutively. On August 9, 2006, Robertson filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Following a hearing at which Robertson was represented by new counsel, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw. Robertson appeals, asserting that his plea was not voluntarily entered and was invalid because he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
Once a defendant challenges the validity of a guilty plea, the state bears the burden of showing that the plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently,1 that is, “that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea.”2 The state may meet its burden “by making a showing on the record that the defendant was cognizant of his rights and the waiver of those rights, or by using extrinsic evidence that shows affirmatively that the guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.”3 In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, “the trial court is the final arbiter of all factual issues raised by the evidence, and after sentence is pronounced a guilty plea may be withdrawn only to correct a manifest injustice.”4 Moreover, “a ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing is within the sound discretion of the trial court, said discretion not to be disturbed on the appellate level unless manifestly abused.”5
