In the underlying civil action arising out of an interstate construction and paving project, Douglas Asphalt Company sued the Georgia Department of Transportation “DOT” for breach of contract, claiming that DOT had wrongfully declared that Douglas Asphalt had defaulted on the contract and that DOT had failed to pay for various cost over-runs. DOT counterclaimed on breach-of-contract grounds, alleging that Douglas Asphalt had defaulted on its obligations under the contract. After Douglas Asphalt appealed from the trial court’s partial grant of DOT’s second motion for summary judgment, DOT cross-appealed from several rulings, including the trial court’s partial grant of two of Douglas Asphalt’s motions in limine to exclude certain evidence and its partial denial of DOT’s initial motion for summary judgment. However, because we dismissed Douglas Asphalt’s direct appeal for failure to file a brief and enumerations of error, we lack jurisdiction over DOT’s cross-appeal. Accordingly, it must be dismissed. “It is the duty of this Court on its own motion to inquire into its jurisdiction.” Punctuation omitted. Guy v. Roberson .1 “If this Court finds that it has no jurisdiction over an appeal, it has the authority to dismiss the appeal on its own motion. Our jurisdiction is granted by the Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. III, and defined by statute. An appeal which does not fall within this Court’s jurisdiction must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Citations and footnotes omitted. Standridge v. Spillers .2
In this matter, the record shows that in August 2004, Douglas Asphalt filed suit against DOT for breach of contract, alleging that DOT had improperly found Douglas Asphalt to be in default of a highway improvement contract between the parties. DOT filed an answer and counterclaim, alleging that Douglas Asphalt had defaulted on several of its obligations under the contract. In June 2006, Douglas Asphalt filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence that it had quality control problems with the manufacture of its asphalt and a separate motion in limine to exclude evidence of DOT’s asphalt testing that was not specified by the contract. On November 2, 2006, DOT filed a motion for summary judgment as to several of Douglas Asphalt’s breach-of-contract claims. On April 5, 2007, the trial court issued an order, which partially granted both of Douglas Asphalt’s motions in limine to exclude evidence. On August 25, 2008, the trial court issued an order, which granted in part but mostly denied DOT’s November 2, 2006 motion for summary judgment. That order also granted another motion in limine filed by Douglas Asphalt, which sought to exclude DOT’s damages calculations. DOT successfully applied for interlocutory review of the trial court’s grant of Douglas Asphalt’s motion in limine to exclude DOT’s damages calculations. That appeal is currently pending. See Case No. A09A0552. However, DOT did not seek interlocutory review of any of the trial court’s other rulings in its April 5, 2007 or August 25, 2008 orders.
