The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia has certified two questions of Georgia law to this Court pursuant to Georgia constitutional and statutory authorization and the rules of this Court. 1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. IV; OCGA § 15-2-9 a; Rule 46 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The questions arise in a declaratory judgment action filed in the federal district court. We have been asked to determine whether the City of Atlanta’s ordinance concerning action that may be taken when charges for water and sewer service are not paid is inconsistent with and thus pre-empted by OCGA § 36-60-17.1 We have also been asked to determine whether OCGA § 36-60-17 prohibits a municipality from retaining, as well as imposing, a lien on residential property to secure unpaid charges for water service to the residential property when the property is no longer owned by the person who incurred the charges. In May 2007, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation “Freddie Mac” filed a complaint in federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City of Atlanta “the City” with regard to the supply of water services to a certain piece of improved real property2 located in the City of Atlanta. Freddie Mac holds an interest in the property by means of a special warranty deed executed by Wells Fargo Bank which had purchased the property at a foreclosure sale after Harold Singer, Jr. defaulted on his promissory note to Wells Fargo, which note was secured by a deed to secure debt executed by Singer in favor of Wells Fargo. After Freddie Mac obtained Wells Fargo’s interest in the property, Freddie Mac learned from the City of Atlanta that Singer had incurred an outstanding water bill on the property of $11,117.90 and that the unpaid bill constituted a lien on the property. Unable to convey clear, marketable title to the property because it could obtain only a policy of title insurance on the property that specifically excepted the City’s claim, Freddie Mac filed its complaint in which it sought a declaration that the Singer water bill was unenforceable against the purchaser at the foreclosure sale; that the water bill did not constitute a lien on the property; that the City did not have the authority to refuse to provide water service to the property following the sale of the property at the foreclosure sale; and that the City’s policy to refuse water service until the new owner of the property paid the sums incurred by the former property owner violated OCGA § 36-60-17. The questions presented being questions of state law and the answers being determinative of the matter pending in federal court, the district court certified the questions to this Court.
1. The uniformity clause of the Georgia Constitution provides that “Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this state and no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, except that the General Assembly may by general law authorize local governments by local ordinance or resolution to exercise police powers which do not conflict with general laws. 1983 Ga. Const., Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IVa. This clause precludes a local or special law when a general law exists on the same subject, with an exception where the legislature has authorized local governments to act pursuant to police powers and the resulting local ordinance does not conflict with the general law. Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp. , 270 Ga. 272 2 507 SE2d 460 1998. See also Pawnmart, Inc. v. Gwinnett County , 279 Ga. 19 608 SE2d 639 2005 local ordinance imposing certain requirements on pawnbrokers not preempted by state law.
