Sunstate Industries, Inc. d/b/a Sunstates Fabricators “Sunstate”, filed a complaint for suit on account, quantum meruit, and bad faith against the VP Group “VPG”, seeking to recover money due for fire protection materials delivered to VPG, plus interest and litigation expenses. VPG filed an answer and a counterclaim, asserting breach of contract, negligence, fraud, tortious interference with contract, and stubborn litigiousness. The case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court returned a “verdict form” and subsequently entered a final judgment, awarding $110,000 to Sunstate on its complaint and “$190,000, plus $18,845″ to VPG on its counterclaim. The verdict and judgment state that the court did not award attorney fees, but the award of $18,845 is not explained. The court entered final judgment in favor of VPG for $98,845. Sunstate appeals, asserting, inter alia, that the trial court erred by awarding consequential damages to VPG. We agree. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment in its entirety and remand for a new trial. 1. VPG has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, arguing that the “verdict form” entered by the court on April 4, 2008, constituted an appealable final judgment, so that Sunstate’s notice of appeal, filed on August 8, 2008, was untimely. We disagree. The Appellate Practice Act provides, in relevant part, that appeals may be taken from “all final judgments , that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below.”1 The Appellate Practice Act must “be liberally construed so as to bring about a decision on the merits of every case appealed and to avoid dismissal of any case . . . , except as may be specifically referred to in this article.”2 The trial court specifically entered final judgment on July 9, 2008, and Sunstate filed its notice of appeal within thirty days of that date. That filing was timely and sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Had the trial court intended for its “verdict form” to constitute a “judgment,” the court would have used that nomenclature. The cases upon which VPG relies, Spring-U Bonding Co. v. State of Ga. ,3 and Caswell v. Caswell ,4 are inapposite because the orders entered in those cases made it clear that the parties were left with no further recourse in the trial court. Therefore, VPG’s motion to dismiss this appeal is denied.
2. In several enumerations of error, Sunstate challenges the award to VPG on its counterclaim. On appeal from a judgment entered in a bench trial, the trial court’s findings will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support them, and the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to support the trial court’s verdict.5 However, “we apply a de novo standard of review to any questions of law decided by the trial court.”6
