We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in this medical malpractice action to consider 1 whether plaintiffs were properly prohibited from inquiring at trial into the personal practices of defendants’ expert witnesses with respect to the medical treatment at issue in the case; and 2 whether the so-called “hindsight” jury instruction was appropriately given under the circumstances presented. The Court of Appeals answered both questions in the affirmative. Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group, P.C. , 292 Ga. App. 276 664 SE2d 281 2008. We now reverse on both issues. In May 1998, Daphyne Condra sought treatment for back, neck, and arm pain from orthopedist James Chappuis, M.D., who prescribed a 30-day regimen of the anti-convulsive drug Tegretol, followed by another 30-day regimen when her condition had not improved. Shortly after Condra began her second prescription, she began experiencing leg cramping and shortness of breath, leading ultimately to her hospitalization, where she was diagnosed with aplastic anemia, a rare and serious bone marrow disease. Condra and her husband sued Dr. Chappuis and his orthopedic group for medical malpractice, asserting that Tegretol had been an inappropriate drug choice for Condra and that Dr. Chappuis had been negligent in failing to conduct blood count monitoring during Condra’s Tegretol therapy to detect any potential adverse reactions.
At trial, Condra’s experts and treating hematologists opined that the Tegretol had caused Condra’s aplastic anemia and that development of the disease could have been avoided had Dr. Chappuis conducted blood count monitoring during Condra’s treatment. Specifically, they testified that conducting an initial “baseline” blood count prior to beginning the medication, followed by subsequent blood tests at regular intervals thereafter, may have alerted her care providers to a drop in white blood cells and in turn led to a discontinuation of the Tegretol and reversal of the development of the aplastic anemia. Condra’s expert neurosurgeon further testified that the failure to conduct blood conduct monitoring was a breach of the standard of care.
