This Court granted Michael T. Bullard’s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of habeas corpus relief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the habeas court. 1. Bullard was indicted on eight counts of burglary, and on January 24, 2000, he pled guilty to five of those counts; an order of nolle prosequi was entered as to the other three counts. Bullard was sentenced to five terms of twenty years in prison, to be served concurrently. At Bullard’s plea hearing, three other defendants also pled guilty to various charges; none of those charges was related to Bullard’s burglary charges. In 2007, Bullard petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made, primarily asserting that he did not understand the rights he was waiving as a result of his pleas, as required by Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 243 89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274 1969. The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers. It is the duty of a trial court to establish that the defendant understands the constitutional rights being waived, and the record must reveal the defendant’s waiver of those constitutional rights. Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 243 89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274 1969. Once a petition in a habeas proceeding challenges the validity of a guilty plea, the State has the burden to demonstrate that the plea was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The State can accomplish this by showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or adding to a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Arnold v. Howerton , 282 Ga. 66 646 SE2d 75 2007. Bullard was represented by counsel at his plea hearing, but the attorney who signed his plea forms died three months after the pleas. A second attorney had appeared at the plea hearing with Bullard, but she was not a witness at the habeas corpus hearing. Accordingly, the State attempted to meet its burden by introducing, inter alia, the transcript of the plea hearing and a form which Bullard signed stating that he understood the nature of the charges against him, and understood that by pleading guilty, he was waiving, inter alia, the “right to a trial by jury and right to counsel at said trial,” the “right not to incriminate yourself,” and the “right to confront witnesses against you.”
Bullard contends that such a form is insufficient to show he understood the rights he was waiving, citing as authority State v. Hemdani , 282 Ga. 511 651 SE2d 734 2007. Although the details of the form used in that case are not stated in the Hemdani opinion, in any event, there are crucial differences between Bullard’s case and Hemdani . First, in Hemdani , the State failed to provide a transcript of the plea hearing, id. at 512; here, it did provide a transcript. And in Hemdani , the habeas court determined that the record failed to show that the Boykin requirements had been met; on the more extensive record here, the habeas court ruled that Bullard had been advised of his Boykin rights.
