Appellant White House Inn and Suites “the Inn” owns 58 acres at the top of a mountain in Warm Springs, Georgia, upon which it operates a hotel and assisted-living facility. By two warranty deeds granting fee simple title, the Inn deeded a total of .25 acres of real property to the City of Warm Springs in 1998, and the City built a water tower on the property. The Inn also granted the City a 15-foot-wide perpetual easement across appellant’s property to the .25 acres. In 2006, the City entered into an agreement with appellee Charles Dean Ginn, doing business as Dean’s Commercial Two-Way, that allowed Ginn to build a radio tower on the .25-acre parcel in exchange for the provision of certain public safety communications equipment and services to the City. Construction of the radio tower was completed in June 2007 and it is being used to provide the service. In May 2008, the Inn filed a verified complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the property conveyed by the warranty deeds may be used only for the maintenance and operation of a water tower and that the easement is likewise limited and can be used only for the provision of water and sewer services. Attached to the complaint were copies of the warranty deeds by which the Inn conveyed the real property to the City “to have and to hold the said tract or parcel of land . . . forever in Fee Simple.” Also attached was the perpetual easement which was entitled “Water and Sewer Line Easement” and which stated it was granted “for the purpose of installing and maintaining utilities, including ingress and egress, to make inspections or repairs on the same, and for any other purposes necessary to construct and maintain water and sewer lines through said property. . . .”
After holding a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying injunctive relief. The trial court declined to burden the warranty deeds with a restrictive use and found that the warranty deeds and easement were clear and unambiguous; that the warranty deeds conveyed fee simple title without any reference to a use restriction; and that the conveying language of the easement quoted above clearly and unambiguously granted an easement for utility purposes not limited to water and sewer lines and therefore included communications utilities.
