We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by adopting a common law doctrine of informed consent and applying it to chiropractors. Doreika v. Blotner , 292 Ga. App. 850 1 666 SE2d 21 2008. Because Georgia does not recognize a common law duty to inform patients of the material risks of a proposed treatment or procedure, see Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland , 272 Ga. 296 528 SE2d 777 2000; because chiropractic treatment is not included among the matters for which informed consent is required by OCGA § 31-9-6.1; and because the Legislature has not otherwise required informed consent for chiropractic treatment, compare OCGA § 43-34-68 informed consent requirements for persons who undergo acupuncture, we reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals. 1. The Court of Appeals first erred by holding that Georgia recognizes the common law doctrine of informed consent. As this Court expressly stated in Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland , prior to 1988, Georgia physicians were not required to disclose to their patients any of the risks associated with a particular medical treatment or procedure. Hence, before 1988, a physician’s “silence as to risk” was not actionable and could not be the basis of a patient’s claim of fraud. Although a physician did then and does now have a common law duty to answer truthfully a patient’s questions regarding medical or procedural risks, absent such inquiry the common law of this state does not designate the failure to disclose such risks a fraud that may vitiate a patient’s consent to medical procedures. As established by pre-1988 precedent, under the common law, evidence of a failure to reveal the risks associated with medical treatment is not even admissible in support of a claim for professional negligence. As recognized by Georgia’s appellate courts, this common law rule could be changed only by legislative act. That occurred in 1988, when the General Assembly adopted the Informed Consent Doctrine, OCGA § 31-9-6.1, which became effective on January 1, 1989. Section 31-9-6.1 sets forth six specified categories of information that must be disclosed by medical care providers to their patients before they undergo certain specified surgical or diagnostic procedures. The Georgia informed consent statute does not impose a general requirement of disclosure upon physicians; rather, it requires physicians to disclose only those factors listed in OCGA § 31-9-6.1 a. Footnotes omitted. Id., 272 Ga. at 298-299 1.
The causes of action asserted by the plaintiffs in Albany Urology Clinic were predicated upon the defendant physician’s failure to disclose a matter not included among those listed in OCGA § 31-9-6.1 a. In reversing the Court of Appeals’ opinion that the defendant physician was under an affirmative duty to disclose the matter, this Court concluded by stating: because OCGA § 31-9-6.1 is in derogation of the common law rule against requiring physicians to disclose medical risks to their patients, it must be strictly construed and cannot be extended beyond its plain and explicit terms. Footnote omitted. Albany Urology Clinic , supra, 272 Ga. at 299 1. This Court specifically found that the Court of Appeals had
