Mark and Reid Tuvim the “Tuvims”, individually and as administrators of the estate of Lynn Tuvim, their deceased mother, sued United Jewish Communities, Inc. “UJC” and various banks, seeking injunctive relief and the cancellation of certain contracts with the banks i.e., “payable on death” certificates of deposit; a trust account, and Series I and Series EE U. S. savings bonds which listed UJC as the third party beneficiary. The Tuvims sued on the grounds that Lynn lacked the mental capacity to contract and that UJC, as a corporation, is not an eligible “payable on death” beneficiary. UJC answered and counterclaimed for the imposition of a constructive trust on the grounds of cy pres1 and unjust enrichment, should it be found to be an ineligible beneficiary. Various injunctive and interpleader orders issued, and, after a hearing, the trial court issued orders largely in UJC’s favor. For example, the trial court, among other things, denied the Tuvims’ motion for summary judgment; granted UJC’s motions to exclude the Tuvims’ expert testimony regarding Lynn’s alleged lack of mental capacity; ruled that the Tuvims did not carry their burden of showing that Lynn lacked capacity to contract; ruled that UJC, as a corporation, was a qualified “payable on death” beneficiary; and ruled, alternatively, that if a corporation was an ineligible beneficiary, a constructive trust would be imposed for UJC’s benefit pursuant to the unjust enrichment or cy pres doctrines. The Tuvims appeal, arguing that 1 UJC is not a qualified beneficiary on the relevant financial instruments, 2 the trial court erred in imposing a constructive trust, and 3 the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of the Tuvims’ expert. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. 1. Pursuant to the Financial Institutions Code of Georgia, a “payable on death payee” “P.O.D. payee” must be “a person designated on a P.O.D. account as one to whom the account is payable on request after the death of one or more persons.” Emphasis supplied. OCGA § 7-1-810 11. Similarly, a beneficiary on a trust account must be “a person named in a trust account as one for whom a party to the account is named as trustee.” Emphasis supplied. OCGA § 7-1-810 2. A “person” is defined in the Financial Institutions Code as “an individual, trust, general or limited partnership, unincorporated association except a joint-stock association, or any other form of unincorporated enterprise.” Emphasis supplied. OCGA § 7-1-4 26.
Here, Lynn named UJC, an incorporated enterprise, as the P.O.D. payee on five certificates of deposit, and as the purported beneficiary on a trust account. However, the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions in the Financial Institutions Code makes clear that a corporation such as UJC is neither a proper P.O.D. payee nor a proper trust account beneficiary. Accordingly, as a matter of law, UJC cannot be deemed a proper P.O.D. payee or trust account beneficiary here. OCGA § 7-1-4 26; OCGA § § 7-1-810 2 and 11. Indeed, contrary to any legislative intent to include incorporated entities such as UJC as proper P.O.D. payees and trust account beneficiaries, the Legislature has specifically chosen to exclude such entities from the list of “persons” qualified to serve in such capacity on the financial instruments involved here.
