This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to OCGA § 40-6-120 a 2, the traffic statute addressing left-hand turns. The evidence pertinent to this appeal establishes that Todd Christopher McNair was driving his vehicle south on a two-lane road when he entered an intersection with a four-lane road, i.e., with two lanes each for east-bound and west-bound traffic, with the intent to make a left turn. McNair properly activated his left-turn signal and then turned his vehicle into the outer, right-hand lane of the two lanes heading east. Officer Bowen of the Dalton Police Department stopped McNair and charged him, inter alia, with making an improper turn on the basis that McNair was required by OCGA § 40-6-120 a 2 to turn his vehicle into the left-hand lane of the two lanes moving east. After the trial court rejected McNair’s assertion that OCGA § 40-6-120 a 2 was unconstitutionally vague, McNair was tried and convicted of violating that statute. A law may be unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to conform their conduct to the law or if it fails to provide sufficient guidelines to govern the conduct of law enforcement authorities, thus making the law susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Footnote omitted. In re D.H. , 283 Ga. 556-557 2 663 SE2d 139 2008. The statute challenged by McNair, OCGA § 40-6-120 a 2, addresses the required position and method of turning left at intersections. It provides as follows: The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall approach the turn in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle. Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made to the left of the center of the intersection and so as to leave the intersection or other location in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction as such vehicle on the roadway being entered. Even though the rules of statutory construction require this Court to presume that a statute is constitutional and to construe it as valid when possible, see generally Rodriguez v. State , 284 Ga. 803 1 671 SE2d 497 2009, we agree with McNair for the following reasons that OCGA § 40-6-120 a 2 is unconstitutionally vague.
The vagueness arises in the second half of the second sentence of OCGA § 40-6-120 a 2. After the first sentence of the statute sets forth the manner in which a driver should approach the making of a left turn, i.e., from the extreme left-hand lane available to the driver in the direction being traveled, the second sentence begins by stating the manner in which the left turn should be made. It provides that, except in situations when it is not practicable, the left turn should be made “to the left of the center of the intersection,” thereby prohibiting the driver from initiating a left turn prior to the vehicle’s arrival at the center of the intersection.1 The language in the second half of the second sentence then requires the left turn to be made “so as to leave the intersection or other location in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction as such vehicle on the roadway being entered.”
