This Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Dryden v. State , 292 Ga. App. 467 665 SE2d 341 2008, to review that Court’s ruling that Chanju Dryden could be convicted and sentenced for both aggravated assault on a peace officer and serious injury by vehicle based upon reckless driving. Finding that the verdicts of guilt for the two crimes must be determined mutually exclusive in this case, we reverse. During a controlled drug buy, Dryden sold illegal drugs in his car outside a gas station. As Dryden began to drive away from the scene, law enforcement officers attempted to block Dryden’s car with their vehicles; Mark Thomason of the Hall County Sheriff’s Department exited his vehicle pointed his pistol at Dryden, and approached the left front side of Dryden’s car. Thomason commanded Dryden to stop and made eye contact with him; Dryden drove his car forward in a turning motion while Thomason attempted to come around the left front corner of Dryden’s car to the driver’s door. Dryden’s maneuver forced Thomason’s left leg against another vehicle, severely injuring Thomason. Dryden continued his turn and escaped the crime scene in his car, but was later apprehended. He was convicted and sentenced, inter alia, for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, OCGA §16-5-21 c, and serious injury by vehicle through the crime of reckless driving, OCGA § § 40-6-390; 40-6-394. Thomason was the named victim of each crime. Dryden appealed, asserting that the verdicts were mutually exclusive, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding that the two convictions were based on separate conduct. Dryden , supra at 468 1.
“Verdicts are mutually exclusive ‘where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other. Cits.’ Cit.” Jackson v. State , 276 Ga. 408 577 SE2d 570 2003. In Jackson , this Court dealt with the criminal intent of a defendant who had been convicted of both felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault, and involuntary manslaughter predicated on reckless conduct. Reckless conduct, OCGA § 16-5-60 b, like reckless driving, OCGA § 40-6-390, is a crime founded upon an act of criminal negligence, rather than an intentional act. See Jackson , supra at 411 2; Carrell v. State , 261 Ga. App. 485, 486 1 583 SE2d 167 2003. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, OCGA § 16-5-21 a 2,1 may be committed either by “attempting to commit a violent injury to the person of another,” OCGA § 16-5-20 a 1, or by “commiting an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” OCGA § 16-5-20 a 2. “A verdict of guilty as to aggravated assault based on OCGA § 16-5-20 a 1 requires a finding of an intentional infliction of injury, which precludes the element of criminal negligence in reckless conduct. Cits.” Jackson , supra at 412 2. A verdict of guilt predicated on OCGA § 16-5-20 a 2, does not. Id. at 412 n. 5. Accordingly, a verdict of guilt as to aggravated assault is mutually exclusive with a verdict of guilt as to serious injury by vehicle predicated on reckless driving, if the aggravated assault is based on “attempting to commit a violent injury to the person of another” under OCGA § 16-5-20 a 1.
