Dante Hampton appeals from his convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of cocaine. Because the trial court erred in admitting extraneous evidence of another crime unrelated to the offense for which Hampton was on trial, we reverse. 1. As the trial began, Hampton made an oral motion in limine seeking to exclude a portion of his statement during the traffic stop which led to his arrest. Specifically, he moved to exclude his response to the officer’s question whether he was on probation or parole. Hampton responded that he was on probation for cocaine. After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion. This was error. It is the general rule that if evidence is relevant and material to an issue in a case, it is not inadmissible because it incidentally puts the defendant’s character in issue. It is an equally well-recognized general rule that what is forbidden is the introduction by the state in the first instance of evidence whose sole relevance to the crime charged is that it tends to show that the defendant has bad character. Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted. Robinson v. State , 192 Ga. App. 32, 33 383 SE2d 593 1989. In Robinson , appellant’s statement to police included a reference to his prior use and sale of cocaine. Id. We held that these statements “did not constitute an integral part of a criminal confession nor was each statement an inseparable part of the total oral statement.” Id. We noted that Robinson’s confession that he had used cocaine in the past
had nothing whatsoever to do with the conduct for which he was on trial. . . . Indeed, the statement cannot be construed as anything other than a denial of the offenses for which he was on trial. Thus, the only possible evidentiary function which the confession concerning prior cocaine use could have served as far as the state was concerned was an impermissible one, i.e., to impugn the appellant’s character before the jury by showing that he was generally prone to criminal conduct. Citation and punctuation omitted. Id. at 34. We then considered whether the error was harmful, noting that “when the two statements regarding prior offenses are deleted from the statement in question, all that remains is appellant’s strong denial that he committed the charged offense.” Id. We concluded that because “the appellant vigorously contested his guilt with an aggressive alibi defense, under such circumstances, and in light of the posture of the State’s evidence, we cannot say that this error was harmless.” Id. at 35.
