On August 20, 2007, the Georgia Department of Transportation “DOT” filed a condemnation petition and declaration of taking, pursuant to OCGA § § 32-3-4 through 32-3-19, to acquire for public use part of a tract of land in Bartow County owned by Walter Crowe and Nelda Crowe Lewis. The taking comprised 1.217 acres out of the 2.807 acres owned by the Crowes, and it included an approximately one acre pond located on the property. The Crowes claimed that the DOT’s appraisal of $46,800 did not represent just and adequate compensation for the taking and demanded a jury trial. The jury determined that the Crowes were entitled to $156,074 for the taking, and the DOT appeals, alleging that the trial court improperly allowed the Crowes to introduce evidence of the cost of building a new pond on their remaining property. We find no error and affirm. The admissibility of evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn the trial court’s decision to admit evidence unless there is an abuse of that discretion.1 Where, as here, a governmental entity makes a partial taking of property by condemnation, there are two elements of just and adequate compensation: i the market value of the portion actually taken and ii the consequential damage, if any, to the remainder.2 In this case, the DOT filed a motion in limine to prevent a general contractor hired by the Crowes from testifying as to the cost of building a new pond on the Crowes’ remaining property. The trial court denied the motion, and allowed the evidence to be presented to the jury.
We have previously held that evidence of damage to property as a result of a taking, as represented by a cost to cure, “may be considered a factor in establishing the reduced fair market value of the remaining property after the taking” although the cost to cure may not be recovered as a separate element of damage.3 Here, the cost of building a replacement pond was admissible as evidence of the consequential damages resulting from the taking, and we therefore find no error in the trial court’s denial of the DOT’s motion in limine.4
