On February 22, 2008, Kevin Lee Jackson entered a negotiated guilty plea to charges of aggravated assault and driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs. The trial court sentenced Jackson to two years on probation. Jackson subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming his plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently entered because he thought the Alford 1 doctrine gave him thirty days “to find my evidence and do what I had to do to prove my innocence.” The trial court denied Jackson’s motion. We find no error. After sentence is pronounced, the decision whether to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not reverse the trial court’s decision absent a manifest abuse of that discretion.2 When the validity of a guilty plea is challenged, the State bears the burden of showing that the plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. The State may do this by showing through the record of the guilty plea hearing that 1 the defendant has freely and voluntarily entered the plea with 2 an understanding of the nature of the charges against him and 3 an understanding of the consequences of his plea.3 The trial court is the final arbiter of all factual issues raised by the evidence.4
A review of the plea transcript shows compliance with the procedures required under Uniform Superior Court Rule 33 in order to establish that a guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. In fact, Jackson’s sole argument with respect to his guilty plea is that he believed he had “recourse” if he gathered evidence of his innocence. The record shows that the court thoroughly questioned Jackson, and then questioned Jackson’s attorney to determine whether the attorney had explained to Jackson all of his statutory and constitutional rights. The attorney stated that she had done so and that she was fully satisfied that Jackson understood his rights, the nature of the charges against him, and the consequences of his plea. The attorney also stated that Jackson would freely and voluntarily tender his guilty plea and that she did not know of any reason why Jackson should not enter the guilty plea or why the court should not accept such a plea.
