Before Richard Henry Quarles Husband and Suzanne Elizabeth Quarles Wife were married in 2000, they entered into an agreement wherein, among other things, the parties waived any and all rights to alimony in the event of divorce. In 2007, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, and Wife counterclaimed for divorce in her answer. Husband then filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to enforce the prenuptial agreement. After a hearing, the trial court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the enforceability of the agreement. The trial court then entered an “Order on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,” finding that the prenuptial agreement satisfies all of the prerequisites to enforceability set forth in Scherer v. Scherer , 249 Ga. 635, 641 3 292 SE2d 662 1982 and concluding that Wife is therefore not entitled to alimony. R. 126-127 Wife appeals from this order pursuant to our grant of her application for discretionary appeal.
The denomination, procedural context, and language of the trial court’s order clearly show that the court was ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment and, although the order did not expressly so state, its effect was to grant partial summary judgment in favor of Husband. See Howell Mill/Collier Assoc. v. Pennypacker’s , 194 Ga. App. 169 1 390 SE2d 257 1990. “Summary judgment is to be granted only if ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . .’ OCGA § 9-11-56 c.” Emphasis in original. Georgia Canoeing Assn. v. Henry , 263 Ga. 77 428 SE2d 336 1993. Indeed, Husband argues on appeal that there is no such issue of material fact. He could have moved to enforce the prenuptial agreement. See Alexander v. Alexander , 279 Ga. 116 610 SE2d 48 2005. In such instances, “the trial court essentially sits in equity and has discretion to ‘approve the agreement in whole or in part, or refuse to approve it as a whole.’ Cit.” Alexander v. Alexander , supra at 117-118. On appeal, the trial court’s disposition of a motion to enforce a prenuptial agreement is evaluated under the abuse of discretion standard of review. Alexander v. Alexander , supra at 117. See also Blige v. Blige , 283 Ga. 65, 66 68 2 656 SE2d 822 2008 where wife moved to have antenuptial agreement set aside and trial court conducted a pre-trial evidentiary hearing. However, instead of moving to enforce the parties’ agreement, Husband “moved for partial summary judgment. On summary judgment, a trial court is not authorized to resolve disputed issues of material fact. A trial court is authorized only to determine whether disputed issues of material fact remain.” Georgia Canoeing Assn. v. Henry , supra at 78.
