After Willie Hubbard, Jr., entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to criminal attempt to commit child molestation, the trial court sentenced him to ten years, including four to serve in confinement. Thereafter, Hubbard filed a motion to withdraw his plea, arguing, inter alia, 1 that he did not enter the plea knowingly and voluntarily because he believed that he would receive a sentence of two years’ probation in exchange for the plea; and 2 that his plea was defective because he was incorrectly advised that the sentencing range for the offense was two to ten years, instead of one to ten years. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Hubbard’s motion. In his sole enumeration of error on appeal, Hubbard asserts that he did not understand the consequences of his plea because he was misinformed of the minimum sentence. Because Hubbard testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea that it would not have made any difference to him had he known of the correct minimum sentence, we conclude that the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in denying his motion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. Once a defendant challenges the validity of a guilty plea, the state must show that the plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently,1 that is, “that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea.”2 After sentence has been pronounced, a guilty plea may be withdrawn only to correct a manifest injustice.3 The test for manifest injustice will by necessity vary from case to case, but it has been said that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice if, for instance, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, or the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges.4 A ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb that ruling absent a manifest abuse of that discretion.5 “Of course, in determining the motion, the trial court is the final arbiter of all factual disputes raised by the evidence. If evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we must affirm.”6
Under Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.8 C, a trial judge should not accept a guilty plea without first informing the defendant of the maximum possible sentence and any mandatory minimum sentence. Hubbard was indicted for child molestation, which carries a sentence of imprisonment of not less than five nor more than twenty years for a first offense.7 At the plea hearing, the court informed Hubbard, who was represented by counsel, that the prosecutor would permit him to enter a plea to attempted child molestation, which “carries a penalty of two to ten years in the penitentiary.” Under OCGA § 16-4-6 b, however, a person convicted of criminal attempt to commit a felony “shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than one-half the maximum period of time for which he or she could have been sentenced if he or she had been convicted of the crime attempted.”8 Thus, Hubbard faced a sentence of between one and ten years. Hubbard was correctly advised that the maximum penalty for the offense was ten years, but he was incorrectly informed that the minimum sentence was two years.
