A jury convicted Marcus Julius Adams of one count of armed robbery OCGA § 16-8-41 and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime OCGA § 16-11-106. Adams appeals, contending that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strikes of two African-American jurors. Discerning no error, we affirm. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560 1979, the evidence shows that on July 21, 2005, Joseph Reid entered a service station convenience store located in West Point. Reid pointed a handgun at the cashier, demanded the cash in the register, and fled from the scene in a vehicle which the cashier recognized as having been driven by Adams when he purchased gas at the station in the past. In the investigation which followed, a DNA sample voluntarily given by Reid revealed that he had been present at the scene. Other evidence showed that Adams was driving the car after the robbery. Both Adams and Reid were thereafter seen wiping down the areas of the vehicle which they might have touched with their hands. And they then got into the trunk of the vehicle and had Adams’ girlfriend drive them to her home in Lanett. Their arrests followed. Reid pled guilty to the offense of armed robbery, and, at trial, gave testimony against Adams.
Adams contends that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strikes of Juror Nos. 23 and 24, two African-Americans, to reach Juror Nos. 25, 26, and 28 who were white.1 Inasmuch as Adams failed to meet his burden to show that the jurors’ excusals were for a racially discriminatory purpose, no Batson error resulted. The United States Supreme Court in Purkett v. Elem , 514 U.S. 765, 767-769 115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834 1995, established a three-step test for evaluating challenges to peremptory strikes on Batson grounds. First, the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. Second, the burden of production then shifts to the proponent of the strike to give a race neutral reason for the strike. Third, after hearing from the opponent of the strike and considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court then decides whether the opponent of the strike carried his burden of proving discriminatory intent in fact motivated the strike. Citation and footnote omitted. Boone v. State , 293 Ga. App. 654, 659 4 667 SE2d 880 2008. While striking a particular juror in order to get to other jurors further down the list on its face appears to be a race-neutral explanation, “only in the context of application can we determine whether such an explanation is in fact racially-neutral.” Covin , supra, 215 Ga. App. at 4. In this regard, we bear in mind that the trial judge’s findings must be accorded great deference, and they cannot be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Lingo v. State , 263 Ga. 664 1 b 437 SE2d 463 1993.
